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Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations



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PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides the fundamental principles and doctrine concerning the command and control, planning, execution, and support of joint forcible entry operations. It presents guidance for joint force commanders (JFCs) to employ in planning and executing these operations, and provides selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) for use by supported and supporting commanders.

2. Purpose


This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected JTTP to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other JFCs and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



S. A. FRY
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Joint Staff

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Introduces Basic Concepts of Forcible Entry Operations**
 - **Discusses Command and Control Responsibilities**
 - **Describes Operation Phases and Support Elements**
 - **Covers Logistic Requirements and Planning**
 - **Discusses Integration and/or Synchronization and Transition**
-

Introduction

Forcible entry is seizing and holding a lodgment in hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, will enable continuous landing of troops and materiel and provide maneuver space for subsequent operations.

The **primary task** of the Armed Forces of the United States is to **deter war** and **defend the United States and its territories** against attack or aggression. To be credible both as a deterrent and as a viable warfighting option for policy enforcement, US armed forces must be **capable of deploying and**, if necessary, **fighting** to gain access to geographical areas controlled by hostile forces. Operational applications of forcible entry operations **range in scope** from an operation designed as the initial phase of a campaign or major operation, to a forcible entry that is a single major operation to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives. Armed Forces of the United States train and rehearse three primary forcible entry capabilities or options: **amphibious assault**, **airborne assault**, and **air assault**. Joint force commanders (JFCs) may select one entry capability or a combination of entry capabilities to complete the mission. Special operations forces (SOF) may also be used as part of or in support of a forcible entry operation.

Command and Control

The joint force commander should organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation.

Combatant commanders exercise combatant command (command authority) over all assigned forces, normally exercised through subordinate JFCs and the subordinate Service and/or functional component commanders. They establish command relationships between subordinates that provide the authority to perform those functions of command

necessary to accomplish the mission. Forcible entry operations employing a combination of airborne, air assault, and amphibious forces will normally be under the command of a JFC. **Concurrent forcible entry operations** occur when a combination of amphibious, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entry options are conducted simultaneously, but as distinct operations with separate operational areas and objectives. **Integrated forcible entry operations** result when amphibious, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entries are conducted simultaneously within the same operational area and have objectives that are mutually supporting. **Special relationships are observed during the planning phase.** These planning relationships are designed to ensure that land, air, special operations, space, and naval force considerations are factored into decisions made concerning the conduct of the forcible entry operation. To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, the JFC charged with overall responsibility for the forcible entry operation may define **operational areas or joint areas**, such as a joint operations area, area of operations, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, or airspace control area.

The majority of the joint and supporting forces require use of airspace in conducting and supporting forcible entry operations.

Effective and efficient **airspace management** increases combat effectiveness by **promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace, with a minimum of restraint placed on airspace users** while achieving the JFC's operational objectives. The JFC will assign an airspace control authority who coordinates and integrates joint operations area airspace and directs changes in accordance with the JFC's intent.

Communications systems supporting forcible entry operations must be reliable, flexible, interoperable, timely, and secure and use standard terminology. **Communications plans should be developed and coordinated by the joint communications staff** to integrate the communications equipment and facilities of joint force components.

The complexity and increased **potential for fratricide** inherent in a forcible entry operation demand efforts by all elements of the joint force to deliberately reduce the risk of fratricide.

Operations

The joint force should set conditions that cripple the enemy's ability to decisively react to, or interfere with, the forcible entry operation.

Forcible entry operations may be planned and executed in five phases: Preparation and Deployment (Phase I), Assault (Phase II), Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III), Introduction of Follow-On Forces (Phase IV - situational dependent) and Termination or Transition Operations (Phase V). Each phase must include contingency planning in the event that objectives become unattainable. **Joint planning** is conducted through a disciplined process by policies and procedures established in the **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System**. Forcible entry operations may become extremely time-sensitive due to political or military circumstances.

Intelligence (to include counterintelligence) is fundamental to effective planning, command and control, security, and execution of a forcible entry operation. The JFC uses intelligence to decide when, where, and how to attack; determine forcible entry capabilities needed and task organization required to seize initial objective(s); support targeting and combat assessment; and anticipate future operations.

Information operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. IO applies across all phases of an operation, throughout the range of military operations and at every level of war. **IO is an essential component** in setting conditions for **forcible entry operational success**. A **successful IO strategy** will contribute to the security of friendly forces, seizing and maintaining the initiative, ensuring agility, contributing to surprise, isolating enemy forces from their leadership, and creating opportunities for exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities. This is achieved through the synergistic application of **information operations elements which include but are not limited to: operations security, information assurance, intelligence support, psychological operations, information attack, military deception, electronic warfare, public affairs, and physical attack and/or destruction** during the planning and operational execution of the forcible entry.

Special operations comprise a form of warfare characterized by unique objectives, weapons, and forces.

Integration and coordination of SOF with conventional forces are always a critical concern. SOF systems must be **interoperable with each other, with conventional forces, and with US national resources** as well as with allies and host nations.

Logistics

Commanders of combatant commands may exercise directive authority for logistics (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability).

Within the context of forcible entry operations, **logistics enables movement and maintenance of forces** from preparation and initial deployment to the envisioned end state of the operation or campaign. This requires commanders to **plan and establish the logistic systems for follow-on operations, if required. Campaign design must include and integrate the six logistic functional areas** of transportation, health services, maintenance, supply, civil engineering, and other services. Successful integration of these functions within the broader concept of operation will ultimately contribute to the unity of effort that is critical to achieving synergy by the joint force.

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for **coordination of maintenance** within the theater. Where practical, maintenance facilities for joint or cross-Service use should be established. However, Service-peculiar item maintenance support should remain the responsibility of Service component commanders. Maintenance priorities should focus on mission-essential systems that can be rapidly returned to combat readiness. **Procuring, distributing, and sustaining the flow of the supplies and equipment** required to support the joint force from the deployment to projected transition operations or termination pose significant challenges to logisticians. Planning considerations must include those supplies needed to sustain assault forces and support the initiation of follow-on operations. **General engineering** provides the construction, repair, operation, and maintenance of facilities as well as logistic enhancements required by the combatant commander. The JFC and subordinate commanders must provide **services dedicated to support the quality of life, morale, and welfare** of the joint force. Combatant commanders are also responsible for the **recovery, identification, and disposition of remains** within their geographic area.

The concept of logistics specifies how forcible entry and follow-on operations will be supported.

The JFC's concept for logistics plays a key role in **integrating and synchronizing joint operations**. Through the concept of logistics, the joint force deploys, assaults, builds combat power, builds supporting infrastructure and logistic systems, sustains operations, reconstitutes, and redeploys or prepares for subsequent missions as appropriate. **Logistic considerations significantly influence the command estimate process** and the course of action selected for execution. The **planning effort** translates the commander's intent and concept into guidance for execution by subordinate commanders and logisticians. Joint force **command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence support planning** must include logistic requirements to fully integrate, synchronize, and support operations.

Integration and/or Synchronization

The goal of integration and/or synchronization is to achieve the joint force synergy that will result in operational success.

In order to integrate, synchronize, and confirm the timing of an operation, **the JFC may choose to rehearse the operation plan**. Rehearsals at the operational level range in scope from joint force exercises (driven by resource, time, space, and force availability constraints), to distributed command post exercises supported by computer-aided simulations, to commanders and/or key personnel conferences.

Transition

The transition from a forcible entry operation to subsequent operations must be an integral part of predeployment planning.

The successful forcible entry should terminate in one of two ways: one, attainment of the objectives; or two, completion of the operational objectives wherein a lodgment is established for follow-on combat operations. Upon **achieving the campaign or operation objectives**, a period of postconflict activities will exist. Termination activities are generally characterized by the transfer of control to civil or other authorities and the subsequent redeployment of forces. If the forcible entry is the first phase of the campaign, then the JFC must define the conditions necessary for transition to the next phase. A smooth transition will require detailed planning, coordination, and strong liaison staffs and/or transition teams.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides the fundamental principles concerning the command and control, planning, and execution of joint forcible entry operations. It presents doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for use by supported and supporting commanders for joint forcible entry operations.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Joint warfare is team warfare. The engagement of forces is not a series of individual performances linked by a common theme; rather, it is the integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities. The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces according to joint doctrine maximizes combat capability in unified action. Joint warfare does not require that all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they are available.”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Purpose

This publication presents joint doctrine that assists commanders to execute effective forcible entry operations. **Forcible entry operations are normally joint in nature**, due to requirements for Service-unique capabilities as well as the military’s increasingly interdependent support, transportation, communications, and intelligence architectures.

2. US National Military Strategy and Joint Forcible Entry Operations

The national military objectives of the Armed Forces of the United States are to promote peace and stability and, when necessary, to defeat adversaries. To achieve these objectives, US armed forces must be prepared to protect the Nation’s interests when, where, and as directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA). The post-Cold War geopolitical environment resulted in a comprehensive reshaping of US national military strategy. This strategy now relies on **continental United States (CONUS) based force projection and employment of an immediately available overseas presence**. To be credible both as a deterrent and as a viable military option for policy enforcement, US armed forces must be capable of deploying and fighting to gain access to geographical areas controlled by forces hostile to US interests.

3. Forcible Entry Defined

“Forcible entry” is **seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition**. A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations (a lodgment may be an airhead, a beachhead, or a combination thereof). A lodgment may have established facilities and infrastructure (such as those found at international air and sea ports) or may simply have an undeveloped landing strip, an austere drop zone, or an obscure assault beach. **Planning must consider the geographic, environmental, and infrastructure realities**. Lodgment requirements depend upon the objective(s) of the overall operation or larger campaign plan (see Figure I-1).

4. Operational Applications of Forcible Entry Operations

Operational applications of forcible entry operations **range in scope** from an operation designed as the initial phase of a campaign or major operation to a coup de main, where forcible entry is conceived as a single major operation to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives.

a. **Initial Phase of a Campaign or Major Operation.** A forcible entry operation may be the initial phase of a campaign or major




Figure I-1. Forcible Entry Operations

operation. To establish a military lodgment, **friendly forces must seize and hold an airhead and/or a beachhead** to ensure the continuous landing of troops and materiel and provide the space to conduct follow-on operations. The establishment of the lodgment, followed by the arrival and preparation of follow-on forces, usually marks the end of the forcible entry phase of the campaign or major operation.

b. Major Operation Within a Campaign. A forcible entry operation may be planned as a **supporting plan** to a campaign plan and **executed as a major operation** within the campaign. MacArthur's amphibious operation at Inchon during the Korean War dramatically illustrated the effects

of such an application. The operational maneuver by Joint Task Force Seven's naval 230-plus armada and subsequent amphibious assaults to seize the strategic port of Inchon and then move inland effectively severed the lines of communications (LOCs) of the North Korean People's Army. This operation set the conditions for Eighth Army's successful counteroffensive.

c. Coup De Main. A forcible entry may be designed as a coup de main that will achieve decisive results. **A coup de main accomplishes campaign objectives in one swift stroke** by capitalizing on **surprise** and **simultaneous execution** of supporting operations to strike directly at an enemy's center of gravity.

OPERATION CHROMITE

On September 15, 1950, eighty-three days after North Korea invaded South Korea, a joint command of the United States, Joint Task Force 7, initiated Operation CHROMITE by conducting an amphibious assault on the port of Inchon on Korea's west coast.

Operation CHROMITE (simply known as INCHON) took place on the heels of the retreat of the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces down the Korean Peninsula in June and July to an enclave on the peninsula's southern tip. The primary objectives were to land a large force behind the bulk of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), recapture South Korea's capitol, Seoul, cut NKPA logistic lines, and provide an "anvil" against which the US Eighth Army, attacking from the south, would crush the NKPA.

Joint Task Force 7, comprised of 71,000 personnel and 230 ships of the Seventh Fleet and X Corps (the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division), commenced invasion at 0630 on September 15th with an assault against the critical island of Wolmi-Do following massive bombardment. By 1800 on September 16th, main landings on Inchon had secured a beachhead and allowed the Commander of the 1st Marine Division to assume command of the landing force from Commander, Seventh Fleet. On September 21st, command of all forces ashore at Inchon was assumed by Commander, X Corps, upon which Joint Task Force 7, having achieved its successful amphibious assault, was dissolved with control of naval forces reverting to Seventh Fleet.

The impact of INCHON was dramatic. The NKPA at the Pusan Perimeter now faced a numerically superior and better supplied force. At their backs, the North Koreans now found a major UN force that was severing their logistic lines. The Eighth Army initiated its attack north to crush the NKPA against the "anvil" of the X Corps on September 16. By September 18 the North Koreans began to relinquish ground. The US IX Corps in the south moved quickly forward to drive the North Korean 6th and 7th Divisions back to Chinju. On the northern and western front the North Korean 8th, 15th, and 5th Divisions were pushed back nearly seventy miles in one week.

By September 26, 1950, units of the 7th Division, IX Corps, made contact with units of the 1st Cavalry Division, I Corps, and Eighth Army. More than half of the North Korean Forces south of the 38th parallel faced certain death or capture as a result of the UN Forces encirclement operation. Compared to the dismal scenes of retreat in June and July, INCHON had produced a dramatic turning point in the war.

SOURCE: OPERATION CHROMITE
US Army Combat Studies Institute,
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas
Joint Command in Korean War Amphibious Operations, 1950
Donald Chisholm, 2000

5. Forcible Entry Capabilities

A geographic combatant commander with forcible entry capabilities compels the enemy to think and fight differently, even if these capabilities are never exercised. As long as the potential for a forcible entry exists, the enemy must guard against that potential that results in fewer enemy assets available to other battles. (For example, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, a US Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) was embarked in the Persian Gulf. As a result, the Iraqis deployed units to defend the Kuwait coastline in anticipation of an amphibious invasion that never came.) Armed Forces of the United States train and rehearse three primary forcible entry capabilities or options. These

capabilities are **amphibious assault**, **airborne assault**, and **air assault**. Joint force commanders (JFCs) may select one entry capability or a combination of entry capabilities to complete the mission. The capability selected depends on requirements dictated by the mission, enemy, terrain, weather, troops, and time available (METT-T) analysis.

a. **Amphibious Assault Operations.** An amphibious force (AF) with a forcible-entry capability can be forward-deployed to **quickly initiate or join other forces in a forcible entry operation**. An AF is defined as an amphibious task force (ATF) and a landing force (LF) together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations.

OPERATION URGENT FURY

Operation URGENT FURY, the US battle plan for the invasion of Grenada, began during the early hours of October 25, 1983 when an elite squad of Navy SEALs [sea-air-land teams], trained in special seaborne operations, landed near St. George's to secure the Governor's residence. A short time later, US Marines landed at Pearls Airport on the northeast side of the island aboard armed helicopters from the amphibious assault ship *Guam*. The *Guam* was part of a nine ship task force supporting the invasion off the coast of Grenada. Meanwhile, in the south of the island at the Point Salines Airport, Army Rangers (flown in from Savannah, Georgia) conducted an airborne assault to seize the airport. After fierce fighting in the Point Salines area, some six hundred Cubans were captured. This assault allowed elements of the 82nd Airborne Division to air-land there. In the meantime, US Marines who had landed at Pearls had reembarked on the *Guam* and were taken by sea to the west side of the island. These Marines landed at Grand Mal Bay just to the north of St. George's. They secured the Texaco oil farm and the Beau Se'jour wireless relay station with little problem. They quickly overcame resistance from Grenadian troops defending the outskirts of St. George's and relieved the US Navy SEALs at the Governor General's mansion.

The capitol was taken with little fighting. Its defenses had been softened by repeated air attacks from US planes flying from the USS *Independence* offshore. The main Grenadian Army camp at Calivigny Point to the east of Point Salines was taken by elements of the 2nd Ranger Battalion on October 27. By October 28 all of the major military objectives had been achieved. By this time over six thousand US troops were on the island.

SOURCE: *The Battle for Grenada*,
Mark Adkin, 1989

- An ATF is defined as a Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations.
- A LF is defined as a Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations.
- As an assault force, AFs may **project power directly against the enemy in a coup de main** or may **attack across a beach** and/or by **vertical envelopment** to establish a lodgment to enable the introduction of follow-on forces. In addition to serving as a forcible entry assault force, such forces are **capable of conducting follow-on operations** from the lodgment. AFs may also be inserted as a follow-on force by sea and/or by air to execute missions as directed.

Appendix A, “Amphibious Operations,” provides more specifics on amphibious operations.

b. **Airborne Operations.** Airborne forces may be used as the **assault force for a forcible entry** or may **conduct follow-on operations from a lodgment**. As an assault force, airborne forces parachute into the objective area to attack and eliminate armed resistance and secure designated objectives. Airborne forces may also be employed as follow-on forces.

Appendix B, “Airborne and Air Assault Operations,” provides more specifics on airborne operations.

c. **Air Assault Operations.** Air assault forces can execute forcible entries using **fixed- and rotary-wing assets**. Air assault forces can deploy from **land-based facilities** and **naval platforms**. These forces can rapidly project combat power throughout the depth of an operational area.

Appendix B, “Airborne and Air Assault Operations,” provides more specifics on air assault operations.

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CHAPTER II

COMMAND AND CONTROL

“ . . . a superior command system may serve as a force multiplier and compensate for weaknesses . . . such as numerical inferiority or the politically induced need to leave the initiative to the enemy.”

Martin van Creveld
Command in War, 1985

1. Purpose

This chapter provides guidance on the employment options, organization of forces, command relationships, and major command and control (C2) functions that support the conduct of joint forcible entry operations.

2. Force Employment

a. Forcible entry can be accomplished through **amphibious operations, airborne operations, air assault operations, or a combination** of any or all of these forcible entry techniques. The JFC should organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation.

b. The JFC should determine the combination of forcible entry techniques needed to accomplish the mission. Unity of command is vital when amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations are combined. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. Schemes of maneuver and coordination required among entry forces need to be clearly understood by all participants.

- Once the decision is made to use a combination of forcible entry techniques to seize a lodgment, the JFC must decide — again, based on METT-T analysis — whether to conduct the forcible entries as concurrent or integrated operations. **Concurrent forcible entry operations** occur when a combination of

amphibious, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entry options are conducted simultaneously, but as **distinct operations with separate operational areas and objectives** (e.g., the amphibious operation around Pearls Airport and the airborne operation at Point Salinas in Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY) (see Figure II-1). **Integrated forcible entry operations** result when amphibious, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entries are **conducted simultaneously within the same operational area and with objectives that are mutually supporting** (e.g., the airborne operation in support of the amphibious landings in Normandy during Operation OVERLORD). Integrated forcible entry operations feature the complementary employment of forces and seek to maximize the capabilities of the respective forces available to the commander (see Figure II-2).

- **The distinction between concurrent and integrated operations is important** because of the implications for organizing forces, establishing command relationships, and applying force to accomplish the joint force mission. In addition to METT-T factors, **the JFC must consider the unique aspects of the specific operation** and should organize the force, establish command relationships, and apply force in a manner that fits the current situation. If the integrated forcible entry operations occur




Figure II-1. Concurrent Forcible Entry

within an amphibious operational area, whether an amphibious objective area (AOA) or area of operations (AO), the command relationships are in accordance with the establishing authority's order that initiated the amphibious operation. Factors that may impact the establishing authority's decision include the following.

- The responsibility for the preponderance of the mission.
- Time, phase, and duration of the operation.
- Force capabilities.
- Threat.
- C2 capabilities.

- Battlespace assigned.

- Recommendations from subordinate commanders.

- Follow-on missions, anticipated operations, or transition considerations based upon the objective(s) of the overall operation or larger campaign plan.

3. Organization of the Forcible Entry Operational Area

a. **Area of Operations.** JFCs may define AOs for land and naval forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but **should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.** Component commanders with AOs typically designate **subordinate AOs** within which




Figure II-2. Integrated Forcible Entry

their subordinate forces operate. For example, the commander, airborne/air assault force (CAF) may assign subordinate commanders separate AOs within assigned airborne/air assault AO(s), or the commander, landing force (CLF) may delineate separate AOs within the AOA for Army and Marine Corps elements under CLF control. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service doctrinal control measures and graphics to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, safeguard friendly forces and noncombatants, and promote unity of effort. Normally when an AO is assigned to an AF, a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) is also designated in accordance with the airspace control plan or airspace control order (ACO), due to the concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons and airspace users.

b. Amphibious Objective Area. An AOA is defined as a geographical area, delineated in the order initiating the amphibious operation, for purposes of C2, within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the AF. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the AF's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations.

c. Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA). A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint special operations force in order to conduct special operations (SO) activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the JSOA to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration

of the special operations forces' (SOFs') mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Whenever a JSOA has been established on terrain that will phase into an AOA, the JFC will establish a timeline for relinquishing control in time for the conduct of advance force and/or pre-landing operations.

d. **Airspace Control Area.** The airspace control area for the forcible entry operational area will normally be **defined by the boundaries that delineate the operational**

area. This airspace control area may include airspace control sub-areas such as the airspace within an AOA. The airspace associated with the AOA is included in the airspace control area. While the AOA is in existence, airspace control within the AOA is in accordance with the airspace control plan and ACO.

e. Figure II-3 depicts a notional forcible entry joint operations area. This particular operational area includes **five major operational areas** within it.

- A **JSOA** where supporting SOF will conduct operations to support overall JFC objectives (e.g., seizure of a key communications complex). Depending on mission requirements (e.g., density of air traffic, size of the JSOA), the joint




Figure II-3. Notional Forcible Entry Joint Operations Area

force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) may request the use of additional airspace control measures to coordinate and deconflict the airspace within the JSOA (such as a HIDACZ, coordinating altitude, restricted operations area, restricted operations zone, and other related areas).

- A **naval AO** encompassing the seaward portion of the operational area outside the boundary of the AOA.
- An **AOA** where an AF may execute a combination of amphibious assaults, SO, and airborne/air assault operations with forces assigned or in support to achieve designated AF objectives.
- An **airborne/air assault AO** that may be further divided into subordinate AOs to facilitate C2 and responsibility for specific objectives within the overall AO. In this example, the ground force commander has requested, and the airspace control authority (ACA) has approved, the use of a HIDACZ to coordinate and deconflict air traffic within the airhead.

4. Command Relationships for Forcible Entry Operations

a. **JFC Authority.** JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they are organized and trained.

b. **A Joint Task Force (JTF) as a Subordinate Force to a Larger Joint Force.** The combatant commander may organize the forcible entry force as a JTF subordinate to a larger joint force. **The establishing commander will provide guidance to the commander of the forcible entry operation.** Applicable guidance on command and

support relationships among joint force subordinate commanders will be included in the initiating directive.

c. **Forcible Entry Employing a Combination of Forces.** Forcible entry operations employing a combination of airborne, air assault, amphibious, and special operations forces **may be under the command of the JFC or a Service or functional component commander.** The command relationship established between the commander, amphibious task force (CATF) and CLF is an important decision. The type of relationship chosen by the establishing authority of the **amphibious** operation should be based on the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, C2 capabilities, and recommendations from subordinate commanders. Command authority options are in accordance with Joint Publication (JP) 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*.

- **The C2 of airborne operations conducted in areas adjacent to the AOA** are specified in the order initiating the forcible entry operation.
- Airborne forces employed inside the AOA will be under the operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of the CATF or CLF, as appropriate. Generally **airborne forces are ready for a change of mission** (e.g., new mission orders from the CLF) **upon seizure of their initial assault objectives in the airhead.** Once the forcible entry has been accomplished, follow-on or transition operations may require changes in command relationships to support the JFC's campaign plan. Supporting operations will be coordinated with the supported commander.

d. **C2 of Special Operations Forces. The Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC)**

exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over all US-based SOF. In theater, the geographic combatant commander normally exercises COCOM of all assigned and OPCON of all attached SOF through the theater special operations command (SOC). The SOC, a subunified command, serves as the functional special operations component for the theater, and when a JFC is designated, the SOC may be designated as the JFSOCC. When serving as the JFSOCC, the SOC may form and command a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) as a subordinate component of the joint force. A JSOTF may also be formed around an existing SOF unit with augmentation from other Service SOF or, when directed, USCINCSOC may provide a JSOTF from US-based forces to a supported geographic combatant commander. The JSOTF is a JTF composed of SO units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The JSOTF may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. The JSOTF may be assigned directly to a JTF. When SOF participate in forcible entry operations, it is

essential that the JFC ensures that missions identified, nominated, and selected for SOF are appropriate. Accordingly, C2 of SOF is normally exercised by the SOF chain of command. The JFSOCC or JSOTF commander exercises C2 of assigned SOF through a number of organizations and coordination and liaison elements to include Army special operations task force, joint special operations air component, and Naval special warfare task group and/or Naval special warfare task unit.

e. **Relationships During Planning.**

Operation planning for forcible entry operations can have unique command relationships during the planning phase as articulated in Appendix A, “Amphibious Operations.” These planning relationships are designed to ensure that land, air, special operations, space, and naval force considerations are factored into decisions made concerning the conduct of the forcible entry operation.

- **The CATF and CLF**, in consultation with the supporting commanders, are responsible for the preparation of the overall plan for amphibious operations. The CAF, in coordination with the joint



USCINCSOC provides SOF to commanders of other combatant commands for operational employment.

force air component commander (JFACC) (if appointed) or other component commander (as appropriate), is responsible for preparation of the overall plan for airborne/air assault operations. Finally, the JFSOCC, if designated, is responsible for preparation of the overall plan for SO. The JFC coordinates planning and resolves differences between subordinate commanders.

- At the time specified by appropriate authority (usually the effective date and time of the initiating directive), commanders of subordinate task organizations report to the designated JFC for operations.

5. Airspace Management

Effective and efficient airspace management increases combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace with a minimum of restraint placed on airspace users — all while complementing and supporting the JFC's operational objectives. **The JFC normally designates an ACA, who has overall responsibility for establishing and operating the airspace control system. The ACA monitors, assesses, and controls operational area airspace and directs changes** in accordance with the JFC's intent. C2 of airspace requires two key elements: a control authority and a control system.

See JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.

a. **Airspace Control Authority.** The JFC designates the ACA. The responsibilities of the ACA include coordinating and integrating the use of the airspace control area.

- **Airspace Control Authority During Amphibious Operations.** In exercising C2 of air forces during forcible entry

operations, **the JFC will normally designate a JFACC and select that individual as the ACA. The ACA is the single point of contact for controlling the airspace of the operational area. If operations are to be conducted within an AOA, airspace control will be in accordance with procedures outlined in JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.** When an AOA has been established by the JFC, responsibility for airspace control within the AOA is typically delegated to the CATF. The CATF will coordinate air operations within the defined airspace with the commander responsible for airspace control in the surrounding area. As the forcible entry operation progresses, the CLF, or the commander ashore having the capability to control air operations, may establish C2 systems ashore subordinate to the tactical air command center (afloat) and incrementally accept responsibility for various C2 functions from the CATF. When full capability is achieved, the CLF or commander ashore may assume full responsibility from the CATF. It should be noted that in some cases it may be neither necessary nor desirable to transfer authority ashore.

- **Airspace Control Authority During Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations.** When an airborne/air assault force is the supported entry force in a forcible entry operation, **the responsibilities of the JFACC, area air defense commander (AADC), and ACA are interrelated and are normally assigned to one individual,** but they may be assigned to two or more individuals when the situation dictates. Based on the situation, if the JFC decides not to assign the JFACC, AADC, or ACA as one individual, then close coordination between all three positions is essential. The JFACC may use airborne C2 assets



A joint special operations area is defined by the JFC who has geographic responsibilities.

to enhance coordination and control of joint air operations and airspace management.

- The distances involved and the duration of airborne and air assault operations may require **establishing special air traffic control facilities or special tactics teams** to extend detailed control into the objective area.

- The volume of air traffic throughout the airhead demands careful coordination to **limit potential conflict and to enable the success of mission-essential operations within the airhead**. A **HIDACZ** may be established around a drop zone (DZ) or landing zone (LZ), which includes sufficient terrain and airspace to permit safe and efficient air traffic control. The HIDACZ can be nominated by the ground force commander and should, at a minimum, include the airspace bounded by the airhead line. Within the HIDACZ, **all aircraft flights should be coordinated with the DZ, LZ, and the agency responsible for controlling the joint airspace**. The air mission commander

coordinates with the assault force commander to select the time on target and the direction of approach into and through the airhead.

- b. **Airspace Control System.** The forces involved in the operation largely determine the choices available to the ACA in designating an airspace control system to control joint air operations; system interoperability will also be a major determining factor. For the airspace control system to function effectively, **the ACA must maximize and enhance the capabilities of the collective force using existing control systems**.

- **Airspace Control System During Amphibious Operations.** When an AOA has been established by the JFC, responsibility for airspace control within the AOA is typically delegated to the CATF. The CATF will coordinate air operations within the defined airspace with the commander responsible for airspace control in the surrounding area. In this situation the tactical air control system will normally be the system used to control joint air operations within the

AOA. The system provides the capability for autonomous airspace control operations, airspace management, and air defense operations and consists of two elements: the **Navy tactical air control system (NTACS)** and the **Marine Corps Air Command and Control System (MACCS)**. NTACS controls the initial phase of the operation. Air control is incrementally transferred from NTACS to MACCS as the force is established ashore. Once control has been passed (phased) ashore, NTACS takes a back-up role to MACCS for landward air operations but may continue to control seaward air operations in a subordinate role to MACCS.

- **Airspace Control System During Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations.** The ACA will normally control the airspace through the **Theater Air Control System (TACS)** and the **Army air-ground system (AAGS)** in forcible entries. Situations may limit establishment of ground systems and require airborne or seabased systems to conduct airspace control.

6. Air Defense Command and Control

The operational area, including ingress and egress routes, must be fully protected by an integrated air defense system consisting of air, space, land, and sea assets. The joint force is particularly vulnerable to attacks by enemy aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles during the early stages of a forcible entry. Accordingly, **the primary objectives for air defense operations are to assist in gaining air superiority. The AADC is responsible for integrating the joint force air defense effort.** All available surface-to-air assets should be incorporated into the overall air defense plan and comply with procedures and weapons control measures established by the

AADC. **The AADC will exercise a degree of control of all systems** through established guidelines, determination of weapons control status, and JFC-approved procedural controls.

a. Air Defense C2 During an Amphibious Assault

- As air defense forces are established ashore in the AOA, **the CLF will request the LF be given antiair warfare (AAW) responsibility for the landward sector of the AOA.** Upon concurrence from the CATF, the AADC will pass responsibility of the landward sector to the LF control agency (e.g., Marine tactical air operations center (TAOC)), while retaining overall AAW responsibility in the AOA as well as coordination duties with the carrier battle group AAW and JFC's overall ACA.
- The AADC bears overall responsibility for defensive counterair operations of the joint force. The AADC may, however, divide the airspace into regions or sectors with regional air defense commanders (RADCs) or sector air defense commanders (SADCs) to enhance the decentralized execution of the defensive counterair operations. The CATF is usually designated RADC for the airspace allocated for amphibious operations. The CATF and CLF will coordinate active defense plans and procedures with the establishing authority of the amphibious operation and the AADC. The CATF usually assigns an air defense commander (ADC), normally on the most capable air defense platform, to actually carry out air defense operations. The ADC coordinates with the tactical air control center (TACC) afloat to maintain a current air picture. If the ADC is not collocated with the TACC afloat, close coordination between the ADC and TACC afloat is essential.

- As LF air defenses are established ashore, the CLF will coordinate with the CATF to create an airspace sector and assume responsibility as SADC for the landward sector of the airspace allocated to the AF.
- When an AOA is established, airspace assigned to the AF usually includes a margin of airspace surrounding the AOA called the amphibious defense zone (ADZ). An ADZ is the area encompassing the AOA and the adjoining airspace required by accompanying naval forces for the purpose of air defense. The actual size and shape of an ADZ is dependent upon capabilities of air defense platforms assigned to the CATF; the size of the AOA; and agreement between the AF's RADC, the AADC, and adjacent air defense commanders. Within the ADZ, the AF air defense agency maintains positive identification of all aircraft and conducts air within established rules of engagement (ROE) and air defense procedures.

b. Air Defense C2 During Airborne/Air Assault

- **During air movement to the operational area, air defense operations will normally be controlled from an airborne platform** (e.g., Airborne Warning and Control System). In practice, extended distances from staging bases to designated AOs may require the AADC to delegate control responsibilities to an air control element on board the airborne platform. Initial air defense assets may be limited to fighter aircraft only. Control of these aircraft will normally be exercised through established procedural controls.
- **Forces initially entering the AO will be accompanied by organic short-**

range air defense systems that must be integrated into the air defense C2 architecture. Preplanned procedural control measures and guidelines may be established by the AADC to expedite integration of assets.

- With force buildup and the introduction of follow-on forces into the lodgment area, **more robust high to medium altitude air defense (HIMAD) systems will likely become available**. HIMAD systems must establish communications with the AADC's C2 agency and be incorporated into the established air defense system.
- Once established, **designated AADC control and reporting centers will normally assume air defense control responsibilities** for forces external to an established AOA or AO as defined by the JFC or the initiating directive.
- **Specific implications for forces supporting CAF are addressed below.**
 - Participating naval aircraft may be placed under the control of the appropriate C2 agency.
 - In some circumstances, naval air defense systems aboard participating ships may be limited. Accordingly, the AADC must take measures to ensure that a supporting AF is protected by other means.

7. Communications

Communications systems supporting forcible entry operations must be **reliable, flexible, interoperable, timely, secure, and use standard terminology**. Typical forcible entry operations communications will employ single and multi-channel tactical satellites (TACSATs); commercial satellite communications (SATCOM); and single-



Communications supporting forcible entry operations must be reliable, flexible, interoperable, timely, secure, and use standard terminology.

channel ultra high frequency (UHF), very high frequency, and high frequency radios. **Communications plans should be developed and coordinated by the command, control, communications, and computer systems directorate of a joint staff (J-6) and with the geographic combatant command to integrate the communications equipment and facilities of joint force components.**

a. **Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Systems Planning.** C4I denotes the process that commanders use to C2 joint forces using the supporting communication, computer, and intelligence systems. **The J-6 should develop the JTF support plan or recommend which component should have responsibility for the following functions.**

- **Communications-electronics during movement.** Determining connectivity requirements for each phase of the operation: for example, to and from staging areas, controlling the assault, and extended requirements for follow-on operations.
- The **communications net** for early operations in the objective area and

transition from assault net operations to normal communications nets.

- **Communications from the objective area through the command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems of geographic combatant commands and other headquarters as required;** communications from the joint force headquarters to and between component commands; and from the Department of State or other agencies in the objective area to the JTF headquarters.
- **Determining JTF communications and data interface requirements** en route to and in the operational area to be supported by the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) and requesting JCSE support.
- **Relay-type communications** for disseminating intelligence or mission changes to component force commanders while en route to the objective area.
- **Electronic warfare (EW), including jamming operations and coordination** to prevent interference with friendly C2.

- Defining the **type of service required** by users (i.e., voice, electronic mail, data, teletype, facsimile, and single or multi-channel systems). Special features such as net structure, secure communications, teleconferencing, and the ability to operate while on the move should be specified.
- Determining **compatibility and interoperability** among communications and communications security equipment.
- Establishing **reliability criteria** and determining alternate and/or backup nets.
- Planning communications support of **deception operations**.
- Establishing **liaison** among all joint force commands for communications planning.

b. Joint Communications Support Element. The JCSE is under the deployment control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6110.01, *CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets*. If the JCSE is **deployed as a unit**, then the inherent advantages of unit integrity are maintained. However, **elements may be employed separately** to permit flexible use of JCSE assets. **The JCSE can perform the following functions.**

- **Provide communications support** for JTF headquarters.
- **Augment or provide contingency or emergency communications support** to meet the critical needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, Defense agencies, and commanders of unified and subunified commands.
- **Provide the latest information concerning US Air Force (USAF) and**

Army communications capabilities that could be required to support joint force operations (e.g., USAF airborne C2 packages, Army super high frequency satellite equipment).

- **Effect liaison with component communications staff officers** within the joint force (i.e., communications staff officers with corps, divisions, and separate battalions).

c. Communications Support for Amphibious Force Operations.

Communications requirements **vary with the size and composition of the AF and must support the specific needs of each phase of the operation**. Plans must accommodate the potential increase in requirements for long-range communications to support dispersed forces over extended distances. **Communications for amphibious assault operations must integrate C2 systems** that control naval fire support, ship-to-shore movement, joint air operations, assault vehicle control, surface fire support, and logistics. **The CATF coordinates C4I requirements with the CLF and other forces within the AF and establishes an integrated C4I plan**. The plan, designed to fully support the operation plan (OPLAN), reflects the requirements of the JFC, CATE, CLF, and other subordinate commanders as appropriate.

- **The CATF is responsible for the following.**
 - **Preparation and promulgation of a coordinated plan for employment** of AF communications during the operation.
 - **Acquisition and assignment of necessary communications assets** to subordinate elements of the force.
 - **Preparation of appropriate operations security (OPSEC) and military deception guidance.**

- **Preparation and promulgation of a coordinated EW plan** for the force.
- **Providing necessary shipboard C4 facilities and services** in support of the embarked LF.
- **Development of a coordinated communications plan for the ATF** for inclusion in the overall C4 systems support plan.
- **Development and promulgation of a plan for communications connectivity** with other maritime forces.
- **Specific C4 systems support planning responsibilities of the CLF include:**
 - **Development of a coordinated communications plan for the LF component of the AF** for inclusion in the overall force C4 systems support plan.
 - **Development and promulgation of a plan for communications connectivity** with other ground forces ashore.
 - **Establishment of computer and network requirements** while embarked.
 - **Identification of connectivity requirements** prior to movement ashore for follow-on operations, if required.
- Other commanders of the AF are responsible for determination of their C4 systems requirements and submission of those requirements.

d. **Communications Support for Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations.** Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, and location of the joint force and the senior headquarters. Significant considerations for airborne and air assault operations include

the use of **intermediate staging bases (ISBs)** and **airborne C2 platforms**, which can add to the complexity of managing the communications architecture. **Airborne/air assault forces will initially deploy with a limited communications capability**, largely based on UHF SATCOM. Communications support becomes more robust as signal units and equipment enter the operational area via airdrop or are airlanded into the airhead.

- C4I relationships, nets, frequency management, codes, navigational aids, and any other communication issues **must be resolved before the assault phase begins.**
- **Long-range radio communications may be necessary** with CONUS- based forces or ISBs to facilitate control of personnel, supplies, and equipment into the airhead or lodgment. **Long-range communications are initially established from higher to lower headquarters.** The higher headquarters may be on land, sea, or air and may maintain contact through retransmission and relay sites. The communications plan must ensure interoperability with the overall joint force communications architecture and provide the redundancy for CAF and subordinate commanders to adequately command and control operations.
- **Ground commanders in airlift aircraft may communicate with the chain of command over the Army secure en route communications package (SECOMP).** Normally, the airlift mission commander and the airborne force commander are in the same aircraft. The senior ground commander can advise embarked ground commanders of changes in the ground tactical situation or to the air movement plan. **Communications installed on either the airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC) or the joint**

airborne communications center and command post may relay information from the objective area. If an aircraft emergency should occur, use of dedicated Army SECOMP will cease at the discretion of the aircraft commander.

- **Airborne/air assault forcible entry operations require the use of redundant airborne and ground command posts.** Normally, a joint force airborne command post will operate from a joint airborne communications center and command post, while a command post from the airborne/air assault force will operate from an ABCCC or a specially configured C2 rotary-wing aircraft.
- **TACSAT downlink and other en route communications systems** can be used to communicate with USAF special tactics teams, theater airlift liaison officers, tanker airlift control elements, mission support teams, and elements in objective areas. The use of **special navigational aids and homing devices** to direct aircraft to specified areas (e.g., a designated drop zone) may be necessary. Specialized airborne/air assault force personnel (e.g., special tactics teams or long-range surveillance units) are equipped with **navigational aids, global positioning systems, and homing devices**. These teams will be employed early to guide the airborne/air assault forces, and provide reconnaissance, surveillance, visual flight rules service, and limited instrument flight rules air traffic control service. Other joint force assets such as SOF or Marine force reconnaissance elements are also capable of performing some of these functions.

8. Fratricide Prevention

The complexity and increased potential for fratricide inherent in a forcible entry operation

demand **efforts by all elements of the joint force to deliberately reduce the risk of fratricide.**

a. **Primary Mechanisms for Fratricide Prevention.** Familiarization with and adherence to procedures laid down in JP 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*, JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*, JP 3-09.1, *Joint Laser Designation Procedures*, JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*, and JP 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*, are necessary during joint operations to avoid fratricide. The primary mechanisms for minimizing the risk of fratricide include:

- Disciplined execution of **operation orders, standing operating procedures, ROE, the ACO, area air defense procedures, and the air tasking order; and**
- Acute individual and collective **situational awareness** enhanced by realistic training and rehearsals.

b. **Specific Force Protection Measures.** Specific force protection measures that should be addressed in plans, orders, and as matters of coordination include the following.

- **Weapons and munitions employment restrictions** within the forcible entry operational area.
- Guidance and restrictions regarding the employment authority, reporting, marking, and clearing of mines and duds, to include submunitions (for example, those delivered by cluster bomb units).
- **Special safety precautions** to be observed during ship-to-shore movement and with operations ashore by helicopters.

- Policy regarding **cessation of naval surface fire support** to ensure safety of

joint forces operating within the operational area, to include amphibious shipping and aircraft delivering assault forces.

- Development and disciplined use of **common operational graphics and associated fire support and airspace control coordinating measures** throughout the joint force.
- Development and disciplined use of an **effective personnel and/or equipment marking system** (combat identification system).
- Restrictions on the **use of incendiary munitions** in built-up areas or terrain where resulting fires might endanger maneuvering forces, indigenous noncombatants, or uniquely sensitive or protected environmental and cultural resources.
- Policy with regard to use of **special munitions and fuzes** (e.g., variable time fuse) in the operational area.
- **Prohibited targets.**

political, legal, operational, and diplomatic factors **that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which the joint force will use force, including initiating and continuing combat engagement** with other forces encountered in the operational area. When requested by the JFC and approved by the appropriate authority, e.g. national command authorities or combatant commander, supplemental measures are issued, as necessary, for mission accomplishment.

a. The challenge for a JFC is to ensure that the ROE for a forcible entry operation **provides the commander with the flexibility to accomplish the mission, while assuring the safety and security of that force.** At the same time, ROE must provide the specified level of protection to those persons and/or objects entitled to protected status.

b. Forcible entry operations are normally characterized by a high operational tempo and violent execution. **Implementation of ROE is a command responsibility.** Circumstances and directives, specifically ROE, can change hourly during forcible entry operations. Commanders must be attuned to changes in the tactical and political situations, specifically as they relate to ROE, and ensure that members of their force receive **timely notification of ROE changes** in order to prevent unnecessary loss of life.

9. Rules of Engagement

CJCSI 3121.01A, *Standing Rules of Engagement (ROE) for US Forces*, reflect

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CHAPTER III OPERATIONS

“The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in a great many places . . . And when he prepares everywhere, he will be weak everywhere.”

Sun Tzu, c. 500 BC
The Art of War

1. Purpose

This chapter provides information on planning and executing forcible entry operations. Section A describes setting conditions for forcible entry operational success and defines the five phases of a forcible entry operation. Section B provides a general framework for planning forcible entry operations. Subsequent sections focus on planning and executing intelligence, information operations (IO), and SO in support of forcible entry operations.

SECTION A. THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

2. Setting Conditions for Forcible Entry Operational Success

The joint force sets conditions that cripple the enemy’s ability to decisively react to, or interfere with, the forcible entry operation. **To set favorable conditions for operational success, the joint force should strive for the following.**

a. **Achieve Surprise.** The degree of surprise required depends on the nature of the operation to be conducted. **Achieving surprise at strategic, operational, and tactical levels hinges on comprehensive IO planning and disciplined execution by the joint force,** complemented by a well-designed and orchestrated public affairs operation. Planners should strive to achieve tactical

surprise regarding exact objectives, times, methods, and forces employed in the operations.

b. **Control of the Air.** Air superiority should be achieved to **protect the force during periods of critical vulnerability** and to **preserve LOCs**. At a minimum, the joint force must neutralize the enemy’s offensive air capability and integrated air defenses to achieve local air superiority over the planned lodgment. **The joint forces control the air through integrated and synchronized air operations.**

c. **Control of the Space Environment.** Space assets are critical to operations. Limiting enemy access to services provided from space assets may also prove critical to the success of forcible entry operations.

d. **Control of the Sea.** Control of the sea enables the joint force to **project power ashore in support of the joint forcible entry operation and to protect sea LOCs (SLOCs)**. Protection of SLOCs ensures the availability of logistic support required to sustain operations and support the transition to continuing operations by follow-on forces.

e. **Isolate the Lodgment.** The joint force **attacks or neutralizes any enemy capabilities with the potential to affect the establishment of the lodgment.** These capabilities include enemy ground, sea, and air forces that can be committed to react to joint force assaults, indirect fire systems and

theater missile systems that can range the lodgment, and related C2 systems.

f. **Neutralize Enemy Forces Within the Lodgment.** The joint force must neutralize enemy forces within the lodgment to **facilitate the establishment of airheads and beachheads within the operational area** and to **provide for the immediate protection of the force.**

g. **Manage the Impact of Environmental Factors.** Managing the impact of environmental factors refers to **overcoming the use or effects of land and sea obstacles, planning for contingencies** in the event that the enemy purposefully contaminates the environment (e.g., deploys nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards or prepares the environment with mines), and **countering the effects of climate, weather, and all other naturally occurring threats** with regard to both operations and force protection.

h. **Integrate Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil-Military Operations (CMO).** PSYOP and CMO planning must be integrated within the overall concept of operation to **protect noncombatants, minimize collateral damage, and preclude civilian interference** that will in any way hinder joint force operational execution.

3. **Forcible Entry Operations Phases**

Forcible entry operations may be planned and executed in the five phases listed in Figure III-1. Each phase must include contingency planning in the event that objectives become unattainable.

a. **Preparation and Deployment (Phase I).** Forcible entry operations are conducted by organizations whose force structures permit rapid deployment into the objective area. Joint forces may deploy directly to the operational area or to staging areas to prepare




Figure III-1. Forcible Entry Operations Phases

for subsequent operations (opposed entry into the objective area without staging bases will require airborne forces from outside of the theater or AFs from the sea to seize and secure facilities for follow-on operations). **The JFC and staff must be intimately involved in planning and executing the deployment of forces to the operational area.** Amphibious and airborne/air assault operations involve **movement planning** from both strategic and operational perspectives. Both operations involve movement from marshalling areas as well as loading and departure from ports and ISBs for the sequenced movement of forces to objective area(s) in accordance with the operation order. During this phase, the JFC will typically conduct **rehearsals of the**

operation as time and resources permit. **Intensive intelligence collection efforts** focus on gathering information to satisfy priority intelligence requirements (PIR) that the JFC requires and determining if the required conditions for the assault have been established (e.g., local air superiority has been achieved). **Reconnaissance and surveillance assets** (e.g., SOF) **may be inserted into the objective area** during this phase as part of this effort. During Phase I, **the joint force sets the conditions that are required for a successful assault**. Air interdiction, naval surface fire support (NSFS), SOF missions, and/or other actions to prepare assault objectives will normally occur prior to the commitment of assault forces. In other situations, political or operational considerations may preclude such actions prior to the initiation of the assault phase of the operation.

b. **Assault (Phase II).** Phase II begins with **joint force assaults** to seize initial objectives in the lodgment and concludes with the **consolidation of those objectives**. **Initial assaults are designed to surprise and overwhelm the enemy with decisive force and to protect assault forces** as they

accomplish assigned missions. **SOF may be employed** to precede assault forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the operational area; to conduct assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or ports; and/or to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and interdiction operations well beyond the initial assault objectives. **Planning for this phase may include preassault strikes** by fixed-wing aircraft, attack helicopters, and/or NSFS to destroy enemy forces in the objective areas and/or enemy ground force reserves, aircraft, theater missiles, and naval forces that could disrupt the operation. Naval mine countermeasure (MCM) forces may be required to conduct MCM operations in order to clear transit and assault lanes of sea-based mines and/or obstacles in order to facilitate rapid movement of landing forces. Landing forces comprised of Army and Marine Corps units will enter objective areas via parachute assault, air landing forces, helicopterborne air assault, and/or amphibious assault. Throughout the assault phase, **landed forces must have immediately available joint fire support** to destroy, interdict, or suppress enemy forces. The joint force must maintain the initiative and rapidly prepare to receive follow-on



The joint force must maintain the initiative and rapidly prepare to receive follow-on forces to develop the combat power necessary to secure the lodgment.

forces to develop the combat power necessary to secure the lodgment. The JFC will be faced with natural and manmade obstacles intended to restrict or halt movement that allow the enemy to mass its forces and repel the assault. Naval MCM forces neutralize sea-based mines and obstacles to provide land-based forces the ability to transition from the sea to land. Combat engineers facilitate insertion of assault forces on land and prepare for the onward movement to the objective by clearing breaches, roads, and airfields of mines and obstacles. Depending on resources available to the JFC, **the introduction of landing forces may be combined with simultaneous strikes against other key enemy assets** throughout the operational area in order to obviate the enemy's ability to react effectively. The assault may be capped by offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations as defined by the JFC's operational concept.

c. **Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III).** Stabilization involves **organization of the lodgment** to support the increasing flow of forces and logistic resource requirements, and the **expansion of the lodgment** as required to support the joint force in preparing for and executing follow-on operations. Stabilization encompasses two major functions: one, **securing the lodgment** to protect the force and ensure the continuous landing of personnel and materiel; and two, **developing or expanding capabilities** to accommodate the introduction of follow-on forces.

- In order to stabilize and expand the lodgment, protect the force, and set the conditions for follow-on operations, **the joint force must rapidly build up combat power in the lodgment.** Force buildup begins with the securing of objectives by assault forces and must be consistent with the overall campaign plan with regard to the proper balance of combat forces and logistics required to conduct subsequent operations. The

joint force takes immediate steps to optimize lodgment throughput capabilities.

- Details concerning the introduction of follow-on forces must be prepared during the planning phase of the operation. **Commanders introduce reinforcing forces as required based on the tactical situation.** All means of delivery are exploited to maximize combat power in the lodgment. Though intended to conduct follow-on operations, in extreme circumstances, **follow-on forces may be required to assist assault forces in the seizure of initial objectives**, or may be used to help secure and defend the lodgment. Provisions must be made to clear follow-on supplies and equipment immediately from offload points to maximize airlift and sealift efficiency. **The joint force must avoid an unnecessary operational pause.** The tempo of operations directed against the enemy must be maintained to prevent the enemy from reorganizing and effectively countering the establishment of the lodgment.
- Whether the forcible entry is envisioned as the establishment of a lodgment to enable future operations, or as a coup de main, **the lodgment must be secured and protected in order for it to serve as an entry point for follow-on forces and sustainment.** Based on the JFC's analysis of the threat and available forces, the lodgment is expanded as required. Dimensional superiority must be maintained in the vicinity of the lodgment, additional ground-based air defense established and integrated within the overall air defense system, and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs) secured and repaired as necessary. Appropriate logistic and communications infrastructure must be established as quickly as possible

to facilitate the reception of follow-on forces.

d. Introduction of Follow-on Forces (Phase IV). *(Note: This phase is required when subsequent operations are planned for conduct in or from the lodgment.)* Follow-on forces provide the JFC with **increased flexibility to conduct operations as required by operational conditions** that are situational dependent. Follow-on forces and equipment may flow via air LOCs and SLOCs into the APODs and SPODs located within the now-established lodgment. During this phase, joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations commence in earnest. Follow-on forces may also deploy to the operational area to link up with pre-positioned equipment that has also arrived there via SLOCs.

- **Maritime Pre-Positioning Force (MPF).** MPF provides the NCA with a strategic deployment option that may be employed to support naval expeditionary forces. **The purpose of an MPF operation is to rapidly establish a MAGTF ashore** that is prepared to conduct the full range of military operations.
- **Army Pre-Positioning Afloat Program (Army pre-positioned force, equipment, or supplies (PREPO) afloat).** Army PREPO afloat provides the geographic combatant commander or designated subordinate JFC with a similarly responsive **brigade-size armored force to be employed rapidly in response to a crisis situation.** Like the MPF, this capability consists of the combat, combat support, and combat service support equipment required by a force to conduct a wide range of operations.
- **MPF and Army PREPO Afloat Employment.** MPF and Army PREPO afloat options provide the JFC with

significant combat capabilities to initiate or prosecute follow-on operations. Fundamental requirements for MPF or Army PREPO afloat operations include intertheater lift and a secure environment (e.g., arrival airfields, ports, and/or beaches) for arrival, off-load, and assembly of forces. These are the conditions that will be achieved during the stabilization phase of a forcible entry operation.

- **Follow-on Force Preparation for Subsequent Operations.** Ideally, all follow-on forces will be organized and tailored so they are ready for combat upon arrival in the lodgment; however, in most situations, **follow-on forces will require a period of time to link up with equipment, organize, and prepare for operations that follow the forcible entry.** METT-T will drive time requirements.

e. Termination and Transition Operations (Phase V). Follow-on forces generally focus on **executing sequels to the forcible entry operation that are designed to achieve campaign objectives.** These sequels may include the full range of military operations. Successful **forcible entry operations conclude in generally one of two ways:** with the termination of combat operations and subsequent reconstitution and/or redeployment of the joint force, or upon transition to other operations.

SECTION B. PLANNING

4. Forcible Entry and the Joint Planning Process

Joint planning is conducted through a disciplined process by policies and procedures established in the **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.** Time available is the critical factor when planning and conducting any military operation; however, **forcible**

entry operations may become extremely time-sensitive due to political or military circumstances. Time, distance, physical attributes of the operational area, or the nature of the crisis may dictate the deployment of a joint force to staging areas outside CONUS. Commanders and operational planners will have to compress planning timelines to meet time-sensitive mission requirements. **Time-sensitive situations will likely demand:** establishing joint staffs and exchanging liaison personnel as soon as command relationships are defined; conducting parallel planning at all command levels; establishing the supporting intelligence architecture from national to tactical levels; pre-positioning airlift and sealift with supported units; loading unit sets of equipment on surge sealift ships at US or allied seaports of embarkation (SPOEs); directing the movement of sea-based pre-positioned equipment to the operational area; and conducting reconnaissance operations.

5. Forcible Entry Planning Considerations

The JFC and staff and subordinate and/or supporting commanders and staffs consider the following when planning forcible entry operations.

a. Determine the forcible entry techniques and/or capabilities to be used to seize the lodgment. Considerations include the following.

- Joint force mission.
- Threat to joint forces en route to, and operating in, the operational area.
- Geography of the operational area.
- Forces available to the JFC.
- Time available.

b. Review and disseminate the JFC operational objectives and intent. Considerations include the following.

- Strategic and operational aims, including the desired end state.
- Planning assumptions.
- Operational restrictions that may inhibit subordinate commanders.
- End state in relation to friendly and enemy forces.

c. Plan forcible entry operations, to include the following.

- Establishing internal policies, procedures, and cycles for planning forcible entry.
- Initiating forcible entry planning during crisis action planning (CAP) Phase III, course of action (COA) development.
 - Coordinating planning activities among the joint force staff, components, Department of Defense agencies, designated forces, and members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community after the NCA has selected the COA (CAP Phase IV).
 - Conducting detailed execution planning (CAP Phase V).
- Requesting personnel and equipment augmentation for the joint force staff as required.
- Establishing connectivity through access to Global Command and Control System with US Transportation Command for deployment planning, as required.
- Planning operational maneuver of SOF with regard to infiltration, logistic

support, exfiltration, and recovery operations.

- Deconflicting planned SOF operations with other operations regarding the following.
 - Target nominations and/or targeting efforts;
 - C4I interoperability and frequency allocation;
 - Reconnaissance and intelligence collection efforts;
 - Use of airspace;
 - Fire support coordination; and
 - SOF reporting requirements.

d. Plan Phase I (Preparation and Deployment). Considerations include the following.

- Identifying command relationships and organizational structure in the initiating directive.
- Determining the forcible entry option(s) to be executed, either:
 - Airborne assault;
 - Air assault;
 - Amphibious assault; or
 - A combination of airborne, air assault, and amphibious operations. The relationship between SO and conventional force operations must be determined and/or specified.
- Establishing horizontal and vertical functional connectivity (e.g., C4I).

- Exchanging liaison officers and/or teams as required.
- Determine requirements for joint air operations C2.
 - Designating a JFACC, ACA, and AADC as appropriate.
 - Amphibious operation: NTACS (afloat) to MACCS (ashore).
 - Airborne/air assault operation: TACS and/or AAGS.
 - Combination of forcible entry operations. Designate use of supported force system or alternative as directed.
- Identifying requirements to gain and maintain air superiority.
- Establishing Joint Targeting Coordination Board (as appropriate).
- Determining logistic factors and establishing airhead and beachhead resupply responsibilities.
 - Amphibious operation: 30-60 days of supply afloat.
 - Airborne/air assault operation: 3 days of supply and initial resupply options (airdrop and/or airland).
- Information Operations
 - Developing guidelines and control measures.
 - Ensuring that PSYOP and CMO planning is integrated with and complements joint force operations.
 - Ensuring that deception operations support forcible entry and the overarching campaign plan.

- Ensuring complementary use of EW.
- Implementing OPSEC procedures to prevent disclosure of future operations.
- Integrating and disseminating available intelligence.
- Requesting communications augmentation, as required.
- Identifying and completing special training requirements within given time limitations.
- Conducting rehearsals.
- Identifying the requirements for reinforcing forces and projected deployment flow, with attention to:
 - Cross-loading among lift assets; and
 - Task-organized by arrival sequence.
- Identifying potential restrictions and/or limitations in force flow, and eliminating and/or reducing accordingly.
- Establishing some redundancy of force capability in deployment flow for added flexibility.
- Establishing call-forward procedures for reinforcing forces, if required.

e. **Plan Phase II (Assault).** Considerations include the following.

- Analyzing potential lodgment with regard to:
 - The ground tactical plan;
 - Potential capability for air and sea landing of personnel and equipment;
 - Space within the lodgment and maneuver space for future operations;
 - Vulnerability to interdiction.
- Operating facilities and/or infrastructure to support operations.
- Identifying forces securing airheads and/or beachheads (e.g., advance, preassault, and landing forces).
- Preparing assault forces to receive reinforcing forces (if required) and follow-on forces for subsequent operations.
- Determining means of delivery and capacities to maximize combat power.
- Calculating throughput capability of ports of debarkation.
- Developing plans to clear supplies and equipment from off-load points.
- Preparing reinforcing forces for combat on arrival.
- Planning the expansion of the lodgment.
- Finalizing the arrival sequence of combat, combat support, and combat service support units.
- Establishing force link-up procedures.
- Planning for casualty evacuation.
- Planning for enemy prisoners of war.

f. **Plan Phase III (Stabilization of the Lodgment).** Considerations include the following.

g. **Plan Phase IV (Follow-on Forces).** Considerations include the following.

- Identifying missions for follow-on forces.

- Preparing for arrival of follow-on forces.
- Coordinating arrival and/or disposition of any allocated MPF and Army PREPO afloat equipment.

h. Plan Phase V (Termination and Transition). Considerations include the following.

- Continuing planning and coordination actions initiated in early phases.
- Planning for reconstitution and redeployment of the assault force.
- Planning for transition to other operations.
- Planning for termination of the joint force.

i. Develop and disseminate OPLANs for follow-on phases (e.g., operations following forcible entry) of a campaign or major operation.

SECTION C. INTELLIGENCE

6. General

Intelligence, to include counterintelligence (CI), **is fundamental to effective planning, C2, security, and execution of a forcible entry operation** (see Figure III-2). The JFC uses intelligence to: decide when, where, and how to attack; determine forcible entry capabilities needed and task organization required to seize initial objective(s); support targeting and combat assessment; and anticipate future operations. CI helps the JFC maintain the element of surprise essential to forcible entry operations by supporting OPSEC and deception. **Intelligence and CI contribute to force protection by identifying, locating, and countering the enemy's ability to target joint forces, support facilities, and operations.**

Intelligence should provide the JFC with an understanding of the enemy in terms of enemy goals, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, values, centers of gravity and associated decisive points, possible COAs, and critical vulnerabilities. Effective intelligence support depends on the JFC and subordinate commanders **clearly stating intelligence requirements and synchronizing intelligence support with the concept of operation.**

See JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, to identify the primary providers of intelligence assigned to or supporting the JFC, and the diverse products and services available to satisfy joint force intelligence requirements.

7. Intelligence Considerations

Intelligence considerations for the five phases of a forcible entry operation are described below.

a. Preparation and Deployment (Phase I). The preparation and deployment phase provides the foundation for subsequent phases of the forcible entry operation. During this phase, the JFC and staff conduct detailed planning to execute planned operations from deployment through transition to follow-on operations. **Specific considerations during this phase include the following.**

- **Defining the JFC's PIR.** The joint force intelligence directorate (J-2) is responsible for assisting the JFC in defining the PIR for the operations. The PIR will guide development of commander's critical collection requirements by the J-2 staff.
- **Forming the J-2 Staff and Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE).** The JFC normally forms a J-2 staff and a JISE to direct the joint force intelligence effort. The J-2 assesses available




Figure III-2. Intelligence Support

intelligence resources and capabilities, and identifies the additional resources (including personnel and equipment as appropriate) needed from national, joint, interagency, and Service intelligence organizations to fully support each phase of the operation.

JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, provides guidance regarding the organization and responsibilities of the J-2, J-2 staff, and JISE.

- **Establishing the Intelligence Architecture.** The JFC determines the size and composition of the intelligence architecture that will be required to support the joint force's intelligence

needs (to include federated intelligence analysis and production requirements) from deployment through the transition to follow-on operations.

•• **Requirements.** The intelligence architecture must be **capable of supporting joint forces en route to and within the operational area**. Ideally, equipment and procedures should already be in place to ensure that time-sensitive information and intelligence can be delivered to the joint force. **Connectivity should be established** between the joint force, the supporting theater Joint Intelligence Center, and other intelligence support bases (to include federated intelligence partners) outside the operational area using the **Joint**

Worldwide Intelligence Communications System and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System. Particular attention should be given to the communications and processing systems required to transmit **high volume imagery intelligence (IMINT) products** to the joint force and subordinate commands. The J-2 works with subordinate component intelligence staffs to accommodate their intelligence requirements to the maximum possible degree.

•• **Space Systems.** Potential space system applications with regard to forcible entry operations include: (1) Providing **early detection of ballistic missile attack** to down-linked ground stations, facilitating joint force response or preemptive action; (2) Providing details regarding the **meteorological conditions** relative to assault force objectives through the Integrated Meteorological System; (3) Providing all-weather **navigation** data to mission planners to ensure that weapons and forces arrive at the objective area; (4) Assisting in determining **enemy order of battle and dispositions** within and adjacent to the operational area; (5) Assisting in determining the **status of the operational area environment** with regards to the status of objective areas and infrastructures; (6) Assisting in determining the **extent of enemy use of obstacles** in the operational area; (7) Assessing the **status of environmental contamination** of potential assault force objectives, airheads, and beachheads within the lodgment; (8) Assisting in the **prosecution of air, sea, LFs, and special operations and joint targeting efforts** to support those operations; (9) Supporting and conducting **reconnaissance and surveillance operations** of designated objectives before the assault phase of the forcible

entry; (10) Assisting in **combat assessment efforts** to determine if success criteria have been achieved with regard to the commitment of assault forces or if reattack of selected targets will be required; and (11) Providing **communications links** between forces en route from CONUS to the operational area.

- **Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB).** The JIPB process and the intelligence effort must focus on: **evaluating the enemy** and its potential COAs; **identifying decisive points** that support the JFC operational objectives; environmental health hazards; and **providing information** on the operational environment, particularly graphic (maps, terrain models, and obstacle overlays) and IMINT products. The intelligence effort must also focus on determining if the required conditions for conducting the forcible entry operation have been met. Based on the JFC's intelligence requirements, **intelligence collection operations are undertaken to obtain essential intelligence.** Throughout this phase, the JIPB process continues to refine and update intelligence products to provide commanders and staffs the means to successfully prosecute operations.

JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, provides detailed guidance on the JIPB process.

b. **Assault (Phase II).** The joint force is most vulnerable to enemy action during the assault phase. Effective indications and warning of enemy reaction to the assault and force protection are paramount concerns during this phase. **Supporting intelligence organizations must integrate and synchronize their efforts** with the overall joint force intelligence effort, **maintain**

situational awareness, and design streamlined procedures for reporting intelligence on enemy forces or activities that may pose a threat to the joint force. These same criteria apply to intelligence support of targeting, target development, and combat assessment during the assault. The ability to detect and track enemy targets for joint force attack as well as to subsequently perform combat assessment to determine if success criteria have been achieved is critical to achieving joint force objectives.

c. Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III) and Introduction of Follow-on Forces (Phase IV). In the remaining phases of the operation, **intelligence assets within the lodgment increase in numbers and contribute to an enhanced collective intelligence capability.** If the joint force headquarters deploys into the lodgment, the J-2 must ensure the availability of sufficient assets to assure uninterrupted intelligence support to the joint force. The J-2 should anticipate an increase in the demand for human intelligence and CI assets to **conduct interrogation, intelligence collection, and support liaison** with the host nation country team and with any multinational forces introduced into the lodgment.

d. Termination and Transition Operations (Phase V). Termination and transition operations will assume **one of two forms:** transition to follow-on combat operations or termination of the operation upon achieving objectives.

- **Termination of Operations.** In this case, where the forcible entry operation is in essence terminated because military and political objectives have been achieved, **the joint force reconstitutes and prepares for redeployment.** During the transition from combat

operations to peace, **intelligence continues to support the JFC's intelligence requirements and addresses the potential for resurgent hostilities** by either conventional or unconventional forces. Depending on the length and scope of the transition period, intelligence support may be required to support such activities as minefield clearing, infrastructure reconstruction, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), or restoring civil law and order, in addition to the primary mission of protecting the joint force.

- **Transition to Follow-on Military Operations.** Once a forcible entry has been successfully executed as the first phase of a larger campaign, **the JFC shifts the focus of intelligence support from establishing the lodgment to sustained combat operations.** Intelligence support for sustained operations, planned during the initial phase of the operation and continually refined as the forcible entry operation progresses, now allows for a seamless transition that allows the JFC to begin execution of the specific sequel that will achieve campaign objectives. In some instances, follow-on operations will be in the form of military operations other than war (MOOTW). These operations encompass a variety of activities that **vary in their respective intelligence support requirements.** Some operations such as a show of force, attacks and raids, and noncombatant evacuations may require the same level of support demanded by combat operations. Other operations such as FHA or counterdrug operations may not involve open combat, but will, nevertheless, still require intelligence support to plan and execute.

SECTION D. CONTROL AND COORDINATION MEASURES

8. Control and Coordination Measures

Control and coordination of forcible entry operations pose a particularly difficult challenge to all elements of the joint force. In addressing this challenge, **the JFCs and appropriate commanders may employ various control and coordination measures that will facilitate the execution of operations** and, at the same time, **protect the force to the greatest possible degree**. These measures include, but are not limited to, boundaries that circumscribe AOs; control measures to facilitate joint force maneuver; fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs); and airspace control measures.

a. **Boundaries.** Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. Boundaries may also define operational areas. **The JFC may define lateral, rear, and forward boundaries** that are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable forces to accomplish their mission while also protecting the deployed forces. **The JFC must decide on appropriate AOs for each of the landing forces conducting the forcible entry.** AOs must be sufficiently large to allow forces — airborne/air assault, amphibious, and SOF — to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. The size and shape of AO(s) throughout the forcible entry and subsequent buildup phases may require adjustment by the JFC. The JFC, therefore, must be prepared to change the size of the AO(s) ashore to accommodate the rapid force buildup and expansion of initial entry points into a more comprehensive lodgment area.

b. **Control Measures.** JFCs may use a wide range of control measures to control and

coordinate the maneuver of joint forces in the operational area. **Two of the more significant measures with applicability at the joint force level include objectives and phase lines.**

c. **Fire Support Coordinating Measures.** FSCMs **ensure coordination and deconfliction of operations** and the efficient application of force on the enemy. They should not be so restrictive that safe havens are created for enemy forces. Restrictive measures such as **restricted fire lines** are particularly important for converging units or linkup operations. Similarly, **no-fire areas** and restricted fire areas are critical when planning to prepare a beachhead or airhead for assault and to protect SOF operating in the operational area. Permissive FSCMs such as a **free fire area** may be used to clearly delineate areas open to attack by any attack system and are intended to reduce the time and coordination requirements for attacking enemy forces. Such measures also reduce the possibility of fratricide due to an avoidance by and absence of friendly forces in these areas.

d. **Airspace Control Measures.** **Airspace control procedures enhance air operations**, particularly with regard to a potentially confined airspace over a specific lodgment in a forcible entry operational area. Appendix B, “Procedural Airspace Control Measures,” of JP 3-52, *Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*, provides a complete listing of procedural airspace control measures. **Some examples include:**

- Coordinating altitude;
- HIDACZ;
- Restricted operations areas and restricted operations zones;

- Minimum risk routes; and
- Standard use Army aircraft flight routes.

SECTION E. INFORMATION OPERATIONS

9. Information Operations

IO involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. IO applies across all phases of an operation, throughout the range

of military operations and at every level of war. **IO is an essential component in setting conditions for forcible entry operational success.** IO assists in setting conditions by: eliminating enemy early warning capability; causing the enemy to disperse forces so the joint force can mass decisive force when and where necessary; severing and/or disrupting enemy C4I to preempt the ability to react to US initiatives; lessening the enemy's morale and will to fight; and distorting the enemy commander's understanding of the situation. A **successful IO strategy** will contribute to the objectives listed in Figure III-3. **This is**




Figure III-3. Information Operations

achieved through the synergistic application of IO elements which include but are not limited to: **OPSEC, information assurance, intelligence support, PSYOP, military deception, EW, public affairs, and physical attack and destruction** during the planning and operational execution of the forcible entry.

See JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, *for more information*.

10. Information Assurance

“**Information assurance**” is defined as IO that protect and defend information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.

See JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, *for more information*.

11. Operations Security

OPSEC attempts to **deny critical information about friendly forces to the adversary**. Airborne, air assault, and AFs preparing for deployment have large, distinct signatures. **Masking the movement** of forces to staging bases and to the operational area is **critical to ensure OPSEC**. These movements may not be totally hidden; however, such details as the composition of the forces or the time and location of the forcible entry may be concealed. The object is to surprise, confuse, or paralyze the enemy. **OPSEC procedures must be planned, practiced, and enforced** during training, movement, and operations.

See JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, *for additional information on OPSEC*.

12. Military Deception

Military deception should focus on **causing adversary commanders to incorrectly estimate** the situation in the operational area. Military deception operations must be closely coordinated with the overall operational scheme of maneuver and other IO efforts. The deception operation will have little effect if it is compromised by poor OPSEC or conflicts with concurrent PSYOP. For forcible entry operations, **military deception operations may be planned and executed to complete the following**.

- a. Deceive the enemy as to the time, location(s), and strategic and/or operational purpose of the forcible entry.
- b. Focus enemy attention and effort away from actual assault objectives.
- c. Cause the enemy to diffuse forces to defend all possible airheads and beachheads in the operational area so the enemy cannot mass decisive force to deny joint force assaults.
- d. Induce the enemy to piecemeal resources.
- e. Desensitize the enemy to US actions by appearances of “routine” activities.
- f. Force the enemy to maintain heightened states of alert and/or readiness for extended periods of time.

See JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, *for additional details on deception operations*.

13. Psychological Operations

PSYOP influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,

organizations, groups, and individuals in such a way as to **support achievement of the overall joint force objective**. PSYOP can be a significant force multiplier. PSYOP can **reduce the efficiency of adversary forces** and **create disaffection within adversary ranks**. Further, PSYOP can be an extremely effective population control measure.

a. **PSYOP can accomplish the following.**

- **Amplify the effects** of military operations and project a favorable image of US actions.
- **Influence indigenous audiences** to support (or at least not interfere with) military operations.
- **Inform audiences** in denied areas. Give guidance or reassurance to isolated or disorganized audiences by overcoming censorship, illiteracy, or interrupted communications systems.
- Target adversary audiences to **diminish morale** or to reduce the will to resist. Exploit ethnic, cultural, religious, or economic differences and give adversary audiences alternatives to continued conflict.
- **Sustain the morale** of resistance fighters and influence local support for insurgents.
- **Support deception operations** by disseminating information that confirms or supports the deception story presented to the enemy through the intelligence channels.

b. **PSYOP efforts in support of a forcible entry operation** may include activities emphasizing noninterference by noncombatants, providing critical information to noncombatants or US citizens in the

operational area, assisting in deception operations, assisting in combat search and rescue operations, and inducing desertion and surrender within enemy units.

See JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

14. Public Affairs

a. Public affairs (PA) operations inform Americans, influence perceptions, and affect the public's understanding and support for military operations. PA operations can also have a profound influence on the adversary leadership and population. Commanders must recognize this power and actively engage with the domestic and international news media in all areas while maintaining absolute credibility.

b. News media can be expected to be on-scene in the area of responsibility — before, during, and after forcible entry operations begin. Commanders must be fully prepared to actively engage the news media, advancing their messages at every opportunity. Media will find people to talk to them. If they do not get information from US forces, they will get it from a less knowledgeable source, or from the adversary.

c. Adversaries can be expected to use propaganda in an attempt to sway public opinion against what US commanders want to achieve. Technology allows adversaries to instantly communicate and transfer information to the international and American media. Furthermore, one must expect the media will attempt to present both sides of a conflict and seek out the adversary's perspective.

d. PA operations can be the first line of defense against adversary propaganda in the news media. PA operations disseminate a continuous flow of trusted, reliable, timely, and accurate information to military

members, their families, the media, and the public. This capability allows PA operations to help defeat adversary efforts to diminish national will, degrade morale, and turn world opinion against friendly operations.

e. Commanders must be prepared to fully engage with the news media. The less US commanders say the more time the adversary has to get their messages across to the public, thus putting the United States in a defensive, reactive mode. PA operations help the commander prepare forces, develop and coordinate messages to use with media interviews to help prepare public expectations, and fully explain goals and objectives the moment operations begin.

See JP 3-61, Public Affairs in Joint Military Operations, for additional detail on PA.

15. Electronic Warfare

EW includes any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The JFC's plan must be developed to ensure **complementary use of assets and weapons systems to effectively disrupt and/or destroy enemy C4I and weapons systems** while protecting joint force capabilities.

See JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, for additional detail on EW.

16. Physical Attack and Destruction

Physical attack and destruction refers to the use of "hard kill" weapons against designated targets as an element of IO. Most destructive attacks to degrade the adversary's C2 systems by attacks on C2 nodes qualify as interdiction. To achieve its full potential in supporting a forcible entry operation, **physical attack and destruction must be linked closely with the targeting process.**

SECTION F. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

17. General

SO comprise a form of warfare characterized by unique objectives, weapons, and forces. The successful conduct of SO relies on **individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often unconventional combat skills** applied with adaptability, improvisation, innovation, and self-reliance. Although they may be conducted as a single-Service operation, **they routinely require joint support and coordination.**

18. SOF Missions

SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish **nine principal missions**: direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, combatting terrorism, PSYOP, civil affairs, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and IO. All of these missions can be conducted in an operational environment requiring forcible entry, where SOF capabilities make them especially useful in this type of short term and/or limited scope operation.

19. SOF Employment

SOF may be employed prior to hostilities, as well as any time during hostilities. SOF missions supporting forcible entries can include the following.

a. **Direct action missions** may include: raids, ambushes, and direct assaults; standoff attacks by SOF air, ground, or maritime platforms or units; terminal guidance operations to direct munitions at designated targets; personnel and material recovery operations; precision destruction operations;

anti-surface warfare; amphibious warfare; and mine warfare.

b. **Special reconnaissance missions** include reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy that may affect forcible entries or secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.

c. **Unconventional warfare (UW)** involves use of indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed by SOF in support of US national objectives in the full range of military and paramilitary operations. When conducted in support of forcible entries, it can be an important force multiplier. UW includes guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape.

d. **SOF support to IO activities** enhancing conditions favorable to forcible entries includes direct action, special

reconnaissance, PSYOP, civil affairs (CA), and foreign internal defense.

See JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, for more information on SOF.

20. Civil-Military Operations

CMO encompass the activities taken by the JFC to establish and maintain effective relations between his or her forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where those forces are employed. Properly executed CMO during forcible entries can reduce potential friction points between the civilian population and the joint force, specifically by eliminating interference with military operations and limiting the impact of military operations on the populace. Use of CA forces and units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CA activities in support of CMO can assist the commander by accomplishing the following tasks.

- Providing **liaison** to local agencies and civilian authorities.
- Enhancing **economy of force** by reducing the need to divert combat-ready

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DECEPTION OPERATIONS DURING DESERT STORM

From 29 January until 16 February 1991, Naval Special Warfare Task Group elements conducted nearshore and offshore reconnaissance missions in support of Central Command's deception strategy to fix Iraqi attention on a potential amphibious invasion by US Marines. The special reconnaissance missions resulted in the collection of information, established a naval presence along the Kuwaiti coast, and focused the attention of the Iraqi command on a possible maritime invasion. The deception effort culminated in a large-scale operation on the night of 23-24 February 1991, the eve of the ground offensive, which simulated a beach reconnaissance and clearing operation. The deception campaign prevented Iraqi units at the beaches from reinforcing those being attacked in the west.

SOURCE: United States Special Operations Command History, 2d Edition

troops from essential duties by planning for and using local resources.

- Supporting **maneuverability** by minimizing civilian interference with US military operations through the setup of displaced civilian collection points and assembly areas, planning and coordinating with local authorities to **increase maneuver flexibility**, and recommending **routes that avoid densely populated areas**.
- Enhancing the effectiveness of sensitive operations by **coordinating with local authorities**.
- Supporting security by **planning for and using local civil police** to maintain order

in support of the security force, providing **information** about cultural, religious, ethnic, racial, political, or economic **attitudes** that would jeopardize the military mission.

- Performing **governmental functions** when local agencies are unwilling or unable to provide for their people's needs and **planning for and training host nation personnel** who subsequently will assume and/or expand upon ongoing initiatives.

See JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, for additional information on CMO and CA forces and activities.

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CHAPTER IV

LOGISTICS

“The great question of the campaign was one of supplies.”

General William T. Sherman
Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, 1875

1. Purpose

This chapter provides guidance for conducting logistic operations in support of joint force planning and execution of forcible entry operations. Specifically, the text discusses logistics during forcible entry operations as it relates to authority for logistic operations, the application of logistic functions, concept of logistic support, logistic planning considerations, C4I for logistics, financial control during forcible entry operations, and logistic status reporting.

2. Authority for Logistic Operations

Authority for logistic operations is prescribed in JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*. **Commanders of combatant commands may exercise directive authority for logistics over their assigned forces (or delegate directive authority for a common support capability over their assigned forces to a JFC).** The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders that may result in the reallocation of commodities and/or service support capabilities. Directive authority may be exercised to alter peacetime as well as wartime logistic relationships as necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved OPLANs; effectiveness and economy of operation(s); and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commanders. The JFC may designate a joint theater logistics

management structure. To assist in coordinating and controlling the logistic effort, **the combatant commander or subordinate JFC may establish one or more of the joint logistic centers or boards** (listed in Figure IV-1) based on the scope of the campaign or forcible entry operation. Boards may be staffed by functional experts from Service components, subordinate commands, or activities as directed.




Figure IV-1. Joint Logistic Centers or Boards

Detailed discussions of joint logistic centers and boards may be found in JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

3. Logistics for Forcible Entry Operations

Within the context of forcible entry operations, **logistics enables movement and maintenance of forces** from **preparation and initial deployment** to the **envisioned end state** of the operation or larger campaign. This requires commanders to **plan and establish the logistic systems for follow-on operations**. Commanders and operational and logistic planners must plan for follow-on operations that will enable the force to accomplish campaign objectives. Commanders and planners must avoid the natural tendency to focus exclusively on the deployment and assault phases of the operation. **Campaign design must include and integrate the six logistic functional areas** of transportation, health services, maintenance, supply, civil engineering, and other services (see Figure IV-2). Successful integration of these functions within the

broader concept of operation will ultimately contribute to the unity of effort that is critical to achieving synergy by the joint force. The six logistic functions are found in JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.

Additional guidance for related doctrine is available in the JP 4-01 Series.

4. Concept of Logistic Support

The JFC's concept for logistics plays a **key role in integrating and/or synchronizing joint operations**. Through the concept of logistics, the joint force deploys, assaults, builds combat power, builds supporting infrastructure and logistic systems, sustains operations, reconstitutes, and redeploys or prepares for subsequent missions as appropriate. **Logistic considerations significantly influence the command estimate process** and the COA selected for execution. The commander ensures that the concept of logistics fully supports the force through the anticipated span of the operation or campaign. **The concept for logistics includes the following.**

- Concept for movement of prioritized force packages into, within, and through the lodgment operational area (LOA). Includes analysis of need for en route infrastructure and ISBs to include locations. Includes considerations for retrograde of prioritized personnel and cargo.
- Concept for theater distribution to minimize shortages or bottlenecks of critical resources.
- Identification of key logistic resources in the LOA and coordination for their acquisition, control, operation, and improvement to support the concept of operation.



Figure IV-2. Logistic Functional Areas

- Identification of logistic resources to be introduced into the LOA and their possible sourcing.
- Logistic conditions necessary to execute follow-on operations.
- Directive authority for logistics to assign Service and agency responsibilities by function, by phase, and/or by geographic area.
- Identifying ISB requirements and associated transportation and infrastructure support.

5. Logistic Planning Considerations

Logistic success hinges on the quality of the planning effort that translates commander's intent and concept into guidance for execution by subordinate commanders and logisticians. The discussion that follows **addresses planning considerations** in developing the logistic system; **identifies potential decisions** that must be made by the commander to facilitate control of logistic operations; **cites general planning considerations** for logistic concept and supporting plans development; and **identifies special by-phase considerations** to support the forcible entry. Environmental and environmental health management are important considerations, given the short- and long-term dangers associated with many materiel items and wastes and the domestic, international, and host nation standards for their controlled shipment, storage, use and disposal.

Specific environmental considerations for all facets of operations are discussed in JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineer Support, not just for specialized logistic functions.

a. **Planning Considerations for Developing the Logistic System** (see Figure IV-3).

- **Geography.** Planners must determine the impact of **topography, climate, and external factors** affecting the logistic system. The various segments of the transportation system, including all waterways, rail, roads, pipelines, and airways demand close scrutiny.

- **Transportation Considerations.** **Sealift** is by far the most efficient mode for bulk tonnage; **airlift** is often the most expedient for people or for rapid movement of equipment and supplies when time is critical. On land, **rail** (for bulk tonnage) and **pipeline** (for bulk liquids) are more efficient than trucks. These factors should influence the time-phased selection of transportation modes to meet operational requirements.

- **Logistic Capabilities.** The capabilities of the base infrastructure with regard to **receiving, storing, and issuing logistic resources** influence the efficiency of the entire logistic system (for example, through the use of specialized container handling equipment). Infrastructure also impacts the size of the force that can be supported. Logistic capabilities considerations include force structure assessments in regard to logistic units and personnel available and the need to possibly mobilize Reserve Component assets to support the concept of logistic support.

- **Logistic Enhancements.** Plans should include means to **reduce the impact of logistic bottlenecks**. Some examples are opening or gaining access to high-capacity ports, expanding airfield parking



Figure IV-3. Planning Considerations

aprons, supplying additional materials handling equipment (MHE), expediting the delivery of airfield and beach matting, and acquiring additional manpower. Maximizing employment of commercial containers vice breakbulk can aid in port clearance and distribution, assuming ports are appropriately equipped. Planners should realize that such a container policy may create problems elsewhere because it requires a great amount of MHE and surface transportation. Automated logistic information systems, such as the Transportation Coordinator's-Automated Information for Movement, provide visibility of unit equipment and the follow on sustainment flow. These systems have been enhanced with automated identification technology to ensure material visibility during deployment and sustainment.

- **Multinational Support.** The level of assistance in terms of transportation resources, labor, facilities, and materiel that can be **provided by multinational support** affects the amount of airlift and sealift that may be required for initial movement of combat forces or sustainment.
- **Contractor Support.** Contractor support can be used to mitigate shortfalls in transportation, base and port infrastructure, and host-nation support while reducing requirements for scarce combat support and combat service support units. It is therefore critical that contractors and contracting officers be involved at the outset in operational planning. Transportation planners must ensure that, when employed, contractor personnel and equipment are included in time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).



Movement of forces into combat is a top priority.

- **Protection of Logistics.** Provisions must be made for **force protection** of the logistic system because it is an integral part of combat power.

Expanded discussions of protection of logistic infrastructure and LOCs, to include the designation of a joint rear area, may be found in JP 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations.

- **Responsive, Echeloned Support.** The logistic system must be **responsive to the needs of the joint force**, extending from CONUS to the forward operational area, providing supplies and services when and where they are needed.
- **Assignment of Responsibility.** Geographic combatant commanders should **assign responsibility** for specific logistic functions to supporting commanders of a combatant command, Service components, or Department of Defense agencies in accordance with their core competencies and the concept of logistic support for the operation.
- **Risk Analysis.** Planning analysis must determine the difference between the

requirements (defined in measurable terms) to support the entire campaign and the logistic system's collective capabilities to satisfy those requirements. **The resulting difference must be assessed in terms of risk** to the force and impact on the force's ability to accomplish the mission assigned.

- **Demands of an Expanding Force.** Planners should provide guidance for **redistributing assets** from organizations with low priorities to those units with the greatest need within the command; **obtain assets** from external sources with lower priority needs; **control allocation** of new assets in short supply; and **provide efficient means** to retrograde, repair, and reissue damaged or unserviceable critical items. Intratheater health services and medical evacuation capabilities must be expanded to sustain the increasing troop population within the theater.
- **Critical Items.** Critical supplies and materiel should be **identified early** in the planning process, and priorities established and alternatives developed to offset identified shortfalls.

- **System Constraints. Logistic planners must understand the constraining factors affecting all phases of the deployment and sustainment plans.** Intra-CONUS, intertheater, and intratheater movements can encounter bottlenecks that limit or degrade the ability to support an OPLAN. Identifying bottlenecks en route to or within the theater is the first step in coordinating activities to avoid overloading LOCs. Traditionally, limited unloading capacities at ports and airfields and limited inland transportation constrained the operational capability of combat forces. **Logistic planners must anticipate congestion and seek solutions to bottlenecks.** Planners assess and plan joint and possible multinational use of real estate, ship berthing and unloading facilities, labor, transportation, and construction materiel. Special consideration should be given to ammunition and bulk fuels port throughput and storage capabilities.
- **Movement Control. Movement control must coordinate the employment of all means of transportation to support the concept of operations.** As the single transportation manager, the Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command will provide for proper liaison with the geographic combatant commanders for movement of personnel and materiel into theater. **Geographic combatant commanders exercise control over intratheater movement** and may delegate control to a subordinate JFC within a particular operational area; detailed coordination may be required to balance competing demands of the joint force, host nation, and/or allied requirements. Whatever unique circumstances prevail in a theater,

logistic plans should provide combatant commanders with the highest practicable degree of influence or control over movement. Operational planners anticipate the support requirements for exploiting operational success to facilitate accelerated attainment of campaign objectives.

- **Resupply Systems.** Automatic resupply works best for certain commodities and when constant usage rates are available. Whether certain units can be **resupplied automatically (“push” system)** or **in response to their requisitions (“pull” system)**, planners should determine supply requirements in the context of a unit’s mission and its operating area. The plan should provide flexibility to adjust planning factors based on empirical data and to switch between “push” and “pull” resupply for various units.
- **Intermediate Staging Base.** Establishment and employment of ISB(s) will be at the discretion of the JFC. ISBs support split based and reach operations. Employment must be considered as integral to force projection and force sustainment.

For detailed information on joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration, see JP 4-01.8, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration. JP 3-35, Doctrine for Deployment and Redeployment Operations, explains the deployment and redeployment phases of the process. For detailed information on movement control, see JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control. For detailed information on JLOTS, see JP 4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).

b. Special Logistic Consideration for Supporting Phases of Forcible Entry Operations. Logistic planning for different phases of multiphased operations occurs concurrently, not sequentially. The following special planning considerations supplement those detailed in JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, and JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.

• **Phase I (Preparation and Deployment).**

- Identify and coordinate for **ISBs** as required.
- Identify **time-phased logistic requirements**.
- Develop prioritized **transportation requirements**.
- Analyze **capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities** of APODs and aerial ports of embarkation, SPODs and SPOEs, coastal areas for JLOTS, and operational area infrastructure to support projected operations.
- Determine **air, sea, and land LOC requirements** to support forcible entry and subsequent operations.
- Determine logistic factors and establish **airhead and beachhead resupply** responsibility.
- Analyze and/or assess **multinational support and contractor capabilities** to support operations.
- Analyze and recommend **changes to time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) flow** to ensure that adequate support will be available at the right time and place.

- Integrate and synchronize logistic support of **initial and subsequent flow of forces** into the operational area.

• **Phase II (Assault).**

- Analyze **potential lodgment area** to ensure continuous air and sea landing of personnel, equipment, and logistic resources as well as availability of facilities.

- Provide adequate **medical support** and **evacuation** to support concurrent or integrated assaults by amphibious, airborne, air assault, and SOF.

• **Phase III (Stabilization of the Lodgment).**

- Project and/or resolve **restrictions and/or limitations** in the capability to support force flow.

- Determine means of delivery and capacities to **maximize combat power**.

- Identify and plan advanced logistic bases in support of the joint force operational concept. Unless additional forcible entry operations are anticipated, planning for follow-on operations will be in accordance with standard joint force logistic planning doctrine in JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.

- Seek methods to maximize and expand **throughput capabilities of APODs and SPODs**.

- Develop provisions to **clear reinforcing supplies and equipment** from off-load points.

- Analyze requirements to **expand the lodgment** with regard to maximum on ground capabilities, throughput, and infrastructure.

- **Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-on Forces).**

- Identify **mission support requirements** for follow-on operations.

- Begin **MPF and Army PREPO afloat operations**.

- Continue buildup of **preplanned supplies**.

- Initiate **civil engineering and construction plans** for support to follow-on operations.

- Plan for reconstitution and redeployment of the assault force for **follow-on combat or operations other than war**.

- **Phase V (Termination and Transition).**

- Redeploy and/or reconstitute **assault forces** as appropriate.

- Plan for preparing the force for **follow-on, out-of-area operations**, such as redeployment to another geographical area.

- Once plans have formally addressed and integrated all six logistic functional areas, the force should be well prepared to begin the **application of those functions** that support operational execution.

6. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems Support

Joint force C4I support planning must include **logistic requirements** to fully integrate, synchronize, and support

operations. Similarly, C4I contingency plans must define **back-up capabilities** that will ensure uninterrupted logistic support of ongoing operations. C4I infrastructure must be established quickly to enable full utilization of logistic systems. C4I planning must also include appropriate **defensive security measures** to prevent penetration and exploitation of friendly systems by enemy forces.

7. Logistic Status Reporting

Logistic status reports provide the JFC with **critical input for making decisions** in a dynamic operational setting. Functional logistic areas for which recurring or special reporting requirements may be detailed may include the following.

- a. Status of **deploying forces**.

- b. **Personnel summary reports**.

- c. **Logistic status reports** for all classes of supply and for selected, critical commodities.

- d. **Projected resource requirements** for probable execution of selected contingency options and associated costs.

- e. **Materiel readiness status** of weapons systems, vehicles, and equipment.

- f. Status of **joint force transportation assets**.

- g. **Medical status** of the force.

- h. Status of **operational area infrastructure**.

- i. Status of **support of CMO**.

- j. **Special weapons** status.

CHAPTER V

INTEGRATION AND/OR SYNCHRONIZATION

“The joint campaign plan achieves sequenced and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, special operations, and space forces — orchestrating the employment of these forces in ways that capitalize on the synergistic effect of joint forces. The objective is the employment of overwhelming force designed to wrest the initiative from opponents and defeat them in detail.”

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Introduction

a. **General.** This chapter highlights some common issues and considerations that integrate and synchronize activities during a forcible entry operation. The discussion that follows is not a checklist, but may be used by JFCs and staffs as appropriate to meet their specific needs.

b. **Rehearsals.** In order to integrate, synchronize, and confirm the timing of an operation, **the JFC may choose to rehearse the OPLAN** (Other benefits of rehearsals are listed in Figure V-1). Rehearsals at the operational level range in scope from **joint force exercises** (driven by resource, time, space, and force availability constraints), to **command post exercises** supported by computer aided-simulations, to **commanders and/or key personnel conferences**. The decision to conduct rehearsals will be influenced by the time available and by OPSEC considerations.

2. Integration and/or Synchronization Considerations

The following discussion illustrates the **type of activities that may occur at the JFC level** to integrate and synchronize a forcible entry operation. This list is not all-inclusive, but presents **major phases for JFCs and staffs to consider** when synchronizing a




Figure V-1. Operation Plan Rehearsal Benefits

typical forcible entry operation. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, reflects five phases for a conventional operation: preparation and deployment; assault; stabilization of the lodgment; introduction of follow-on forces; and termination and transition. The number and types of phases for forcible entry operations, as with all operations, may vary; however, five will be discussed in this publication. The example assumes that a combination of forcible entry techniques will be used to obtain a lodgment as the initial operation of a larger campaign. These phases are normally sequential but may overlap. During planning, commanders must establish conditions for transitioning from one phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations.

a. Phase I: Preparation and Deployment

- An accurate TPFDL is developed up through level 4 detail.
- The JFC assigns complementary and/or deconflicted missions to components.
- Areas of operations are designated.
- Command, supported, and/or supporting relationships are delineated.
- The intelligence effort for components is prioritized.
- Initial air apportionment decisions are made.
- Targeting guidance is disseminated.
- Desired arrival sequence of forces in the operational area is matched to available transportation and validated with the TPFDD.

- Integration and/or synchronization with other (if any) operations is completed.
- Deception operations are executed.
- Advance force operations (e.g., countermine, air superiority, battlespace preparation and isolation) are executed.
- Sustainment activities and/or requirements are planned.

b. Phase II: Assault

- Air apportionment is reassessed and revised.
- H-Hour synchronization is completed among components.
- Modifications to existing plans and branches and/or sequels are deconflicted.
- AOs and AOAs are activated.
- Fire support coordination and airspace control measures are activated.
- Pre H-Hour activities and/or staging are completed.
- Supported and supporting relationships among components are modified.

c. Phase III: Stabilization of the Lodgment

- Terrain management issues are addressed.
- Component boundaries are adjusted or AOs expanded.
- Airspace management is coordinated.
- TPFDL flow is managed.

d. Phase IV: Introduction of Follow-on Forces

- Force sequencing is adjusted continuously.
- Battle handover is completed.
- Reconstitution and/or redeployment of assault forces (e.g., embark the LF for a subsequent mission) is completed.
- Rear area operations issues are addressed.
- AOA is dissolved.

e. Phase V: Termination and Transition

- Joint force and/or component missions and command relationships are reorganized.
- Priorities of support are shifted.

3. Termination and Transition of Forcible Entry Operations

The transition from a forcible entry operation to subsequent operations or termination must be an integral part of predeployment planning. **The successful forcible entry operation should terminate in one of two ways:** one, attainment of the campaign objectives (termination); or two, completion of the operational objectives wherein a lodgment is established for follow-on combat operations (transition).

a. **Achievement of Campaign Objectives.** If the forcible entry operation accomplishes the strategic objectives, then the JFC may be directed to **reconstitute and redeploy the joint force** either to home station or to some other theater of operations.

b. **Achievement of Operational Objectives.** In many cases, a forcible entry

operation will probably be only one phase of a campaign or major operation. As such, **the forcible entry operation establishes the conditions for follow-on operations.** These operations occur across the range of military operations and include war and MOOTW.

See JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, for details on MOOTW.

c. Upon achieving the campaign or operation objectives, a period of postconflict activities will exist. The JFC must not only prepare the joint force for redeployment, but must also ensure that the objectives achieved by the forcible entry operation are sustained. **Termination activities are generally characterized by the transfer of control to civil or other authorities and the subsequent redeployment of forces.** Activities may include the following.

- **Establishing detailed conditions for transfer of authority** to other agencies or authorities. Teams from current and future headquarters, along with liaison staffs, should be established.
- **Reorganization of the joint force** and establishment of new command relationships and missions for components and subordinate units.
- **Conducting reconstitution and redeployment operations.** Joint force combat power will likely be depleted to some degree as a result of the forcible entry. The JFC may conduct reconstitution of forces prior to redeployment, considering the time, resources, and subsequent mission of the joint force.

4. Summary

a. Planning accomplished during the preparation and deployment phase of a

forcible entry operation establishes the conditions for the transition to successful follow-on operations. Plans must accommodate accelerations or delays in transitioning from a forcible entry operation to those follow-on operations deemed necessary to reach the JFC's operational objectives. Ultimately, that planning and subsequent execution determines the degree to which US policy objectives are achieved.

b. Synchronizing military actions in purpose, space, and time to achieve decisive

results is the essence of operational art. The beginning forcible entry actions of Operation JUST CAUSE provide a case study of a synchronized operation that achieved synergistic effects.

c. The JFC use of a similar strategy has significant potential with regard to synchronizing the concept of operations. Regardless of the strategies or techniques used, the goal of synchronization remains the same: to achieve the joint force synergy that will result in operational success.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF. The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from continental United States bases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield — its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. Special operations forces (SOF) reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets. At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets — most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that joint force commanders organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOF to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets. The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attacks against enemy command and control facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decisionmaking. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours, and casualties were minimal. It was a classic coup de main.

VARIOUS SOURCES

APPENDIX A

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

1. Purpose

This appendix provides an overview of amphibious operations. For detailed information, see JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*.

2. Amphibious Operations

Many forcible entry operations involve the use of an amphibious assault. JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, defines an amphibious operation as “a military operation launched from the sea by an AF, embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing an LF ashore to accomplish the assigned mission.” The essential usefulness of an amphibious operation stems from its mobility, flexibility in task organization, ability to rapidly build up combat power ashore, and sustainability. Amphibious operations can exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy weakness by projecting combat power at the most advantageous location and time. As with other types of forcible entry operations, the threat of amphibious operations can induce enemies to divert forces, establish or reinforce defensive positions, divert major resources, or disperse forces.

a. Types of Amphibious Operations. There are five major types of amphibious operations; each has the potential to contribute to joint operations, from MOOTW to large-scale amphibious assaults in a major theater war. The five types are amphibious assault, amphibious raid, amphibious demonstration, amphibious withdrawal, and other operations. Amphibious assault is the principal type of amphibious operation employed in forcible entry operations. Amphibious assault establishes a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Amphibious raids and

amphibious demonstrations may be used to support an assault. Raids are swift incursions into enemy territory from the sea, followed by a planned withdrawal. Demonstrations are conducted to deceive the enemy by a show of force that deludes the enemy into believing that an amphibious assault is about to be conducted. Amphibious withdrawal involves the extraction of forces by sea from a hostile or potentially hostile area. Other operations that AFs are especially suited to perform are noncombatant evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance.

b. Characteristics. An amphibious landing normally requires extensive air and fire support and the integrated efforts of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. As a result, joint training and extensive rehearsals are required. An amphibious operation is executed within a clearly defined operational area, either an AOA or an AO with a HIDACZ. This operational area includes land surfaces, water surfaces and subsurfaces, and the airspace above them.

c. Amphibious Force Composition. An AF is composed of an ATF and an LF together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations.

- An ATF is defined as a Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations.
- An LF is defined as a Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations.

3. Organization and Command

a. Establishing Authority. The establishing authority is the JFC, Service component commander, or functional

component commander delegated overall responsibility for the operation. The establishing authority is responsible for establishing communications channels with assigned forces to facilitate planning prior to issuance of the order initiating the amphibious operation, and for coordinating requirements which cannot be met from within the AF, such as additional forces, shipping, or intelligence. The command relationship established between the CATF and CLF is an important decision. The type of relationship chosen by the establishing authority of the amphibious operation should be based on the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, C2 capabilities, and recommendations from subordinate commanders. Command authority options are described in JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*.

b. Principles of Amphibious Organization. Considerations that govern task organization of forces for any combat operation apply to amphibious operations. However, the organization for execution of the amphibious operation reflects complex interrelationships at every level among the elements of the LF, naval forces, SOF, and participating Air Force forces. These interrelationships dictate that special emphasis be given to task grouping and economy.

- **Task Grouping.** After the mission is analyzed and necessary forces are allocated, they are assigned to task groups according to their respective functions in support of the amphibious operation.
- **Economy.** Amphibious operations make extensive demands on shipping. Limited availability of these assets requires that the landing force be composed of only those units necessary to accomplish the mission. There must, however, be a balance between resource constraints and the decisive force necessary to

successfully conduct a forcible entry operation.

- **Chains of Command.** The JFC, or establishing authority, has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. The JFC ensures unity of effort in achieving the amphibious objectives by establishing unity of command over AFs. Accordingly, he or she will choose a command relationship between the CATF and CLF appropriate to the mission. Elements of the AF (ATF and LF) may be embarked on the same platforms, but responsible to different, or parallel, chains of command. Such parallel chains create special requirements for coordination. The CATF is a Navy officer responsible for the Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. The CLF is a Marine Corps or Army officer responsible for the Marine and/or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations.

c. Navy Forces. The Navy component of the AF, that may consist of US and multinational forces, is organized according to the separate functional tasks required to meet the operational requirements. The key operational characteristics upon which the Navy organization is based include movement, force protection, power projection, functional control, NSFS, surveillance, deception, logistics, and SO. Each task group may be organized separately, or several may be combined based upon operational requirements.

d. Landing Forces

- **Landing Force.** The LF component of the AF is composed of Marine Corps, Army, or both forces. It consists of command, combat, combat support, and

combat service support forces. It is task-organized to conduct ship-to-shore movement of personnel and materiel by air and surface. It also provides and controls supporting fires, air support, and logistics to landing force units during the assault phase of an amphibious operation. Both the MPF and Army PREPO afloat programs are ideally suited to support Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-on Forces) of a forcible entry operation.

- **Marine Air-Ground Task Force.** A MAGTF is comprised of a command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element (CSSE). (Army and multinational forces are composed of elements similar to the MAGTF when conducting amphibious assault operations. However, the exact composition of their forces will depend on the situation and the needs of the JFC.) The MAGTF will vary in size depending on the requirements of the AF mission. Notional task organizations include the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), and Marine expeditionary unit (MEU).

See JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities, for expanded task organization and capabilities.

- **MEF.** The MEF may range in size from less than one full division to several divisions and an aircraft wing or wings. A division-sized MEF consists of one division and one wing; the ground combat element includes nine infantry battalions in three regiments. Normally, a force of this size would include one artillery regiment, a tank battalion, an assault amphibious battalion, a light armored reconnaissance battalion, a combat engineer battalion, and a reconnaissance battalion. The CSSE can

provide supplies, maintenance, engineering, motor transport, and medical and dental care for 60 days.

- **MEB.** The MEB is a mid-sized MAGTF that provides combatant commanders with an extremely flexible expeditionary force. Commanded by a general officer, a MEB is normally built around a ground combat element of a reinforced infantry regiment. The aviation combat element consists of a Marine aircraft group with fixed- and rotary-wing squadrons. The CSSE is organized to provide the full spectrum of combat service support to the MEB. As an expeditionary force, the MEB is capable of rapid deployment and employment via amphibious shipping and strategic airlift and sealift, marrying with maritime or geographical pre-positioning force assets or any combination thereof. The MEB is a complete fighting force with a self-sustainment capability of 30 days. It can function alone, as a logical follow-on force to the MEU, a part of the JTF, or as the lead element of a MEF.

- **MEU.** The MEU is comprised of a reinforced infantry battalion and a reinforced aircraft squadron. Usually sea-based, the MEU is the most responsive MAGTF. It normally is prepared to operate with 15 days of ammunition, supplies, and medical support. It can be reinforced or resupplied rapidly. Usually embarked aboard three to five Navy amphibious ships, the MEU may also be airlifted. Two to three MEUs usually are deployed forward or standing ready for immediate movement to forward combat areas or peacetime crisis points.

- **Maritime Pre-positioning Force and Army Afloat Pre-positioning.** See

Chapter III, “Operations,” for a discussion of the MPF and Army PREPO afloat programs.

e. **Air Force Forces**

- When Air Force forces are made available to the AF by the JFC, they will normally be task-organized under the command of an Air Force officer. In that event, the CATF normally exercises TACON of these Air Force forces.
- When the Air Forces for the amphibious operation are provided by the USAF component of the joint force and assigned to the AF, the Air Force component commander should provide a USAF liaison officer to advise the CATF and assist the ATF tactical air officer concerning the total air effort in the AOA. At the CATF’s discretion (based on criteria such as ability to perform the function and the preponderance of aviation assets), that officer will normally be assigned as the ATF tactical air officer. In addition, the Air Force component commander should provide staff officers to integrate into CATF and tactical air officer staffs. When control of air operations is passed ashore, those Air Force officers will normally assume the same responsibilities for the CLF or the appropriate commander ashore, as they had for the CATF.

f. **Advance Force.** The advance force precedes the main AF to begin shaping and gathering information on the operational area. Forward-deployed amphibious forces normally have an embarked naval special warfare task unit, consisting of a sea-air-land platoon, a special boat unit detachment, and US Marine Corps reconnaissance units. These forces may conduct reconnaissance, hydrographic surveys, and direct action missions which will provide critical information to the CATF and CLF.

g. **Planning Relationships.** Operational planning for an amphibious operation is designed to ensure that both ATF and LF considerations are adequately factored into the operational decision. The CATF and CLF are responsible for preparation of the overall plan and are co-equal in planning matters.

4. Termination of the Amphibious Operations

When the amphibious mission has been completed, the CATF and CLF will recommend termination of the amphibious operation and, if required, the disestablishment of the AOA or AO, as appropriate. The JFC, or other designated superior commander, provides positive instructions governing termination of the operation and, if possible, command arrangements, force dispositions, and operations to be in effect following termination of the amphibious operation.

5. Transition

As conditions permit, the buildup of forces and supplies for follow-on operations is conducted as specified in the initiating directive. The termination of the amphibious operation depends on the accomplishment of the AF mission. The establishment of the LF ashore may be specified as one of the conditions. When the AF mission is to establish a lodgment, the beachhead must be secure and sufficient forces must be established ashore to ensure continuous landings to support subsequent operations. C4I and supporting arms coordination facilities must be established ashore, and the CLF must be ready to assume responsibility for subsequent operations. When follow-on operations are to be conducted by forces other than the LF, these forces must be in position and ready to initiate operations as directed.

APPENDIX B

AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

Joint airborne and air assault operations involve the air movement and delivery of specially trained combat forces and logistic support into an objective area to execute a mission. Airborne and air assault forces provide the commander with the unique ability to quickly respond on short notice and mass rapidly on critical targets. Airborne operations are executed by specially trained forces and can be launched at a considerable distance away from the target area with such speed as to cause tactical or operational surprise and prevent effective action by the enemy. Airborne forces can secure and/or destroy critical installations, facilities or terrain; reinforce US and multinational forces; and conduct a show of force or attack an adversary in isolated areas. Air assault operations increase mobility and freedom of action by providing operational and tactical mobility for both the offense and defense. Air operations enable forces to reduce time and space limitations normally encountered in movement of assault forces by land, cross terrain obstacles, bypass hostile areas, and attack, destroy, and/or seize objectives deep in enemy territory. Each component can significantly contribute to the successful execution of airborne and air assault operations.

2. Concept of Airborne and Air Assault Operations

a. Airborne and air assault forces are capable of conducting operations in support of strategic, operational and tactical objectives. They land intact with weapons, ammunition and other combat equipment and are prepared for combat immediately. When properly employed, airborne forces aggressively seize and maintain the initiative

until follow-on forces are committed to the fight. An airborne operation usually terminates upon seizure of the objective, linkup with other ground forces, or extraction. Air assault operations are deliberate, precisely planned, and vigorously executed to strike over extended distances and attack the enemy. Alerting rapid deployment forces for employment or moving naval expeditionary forces toward the area of the crisis is a show of force that is politically significant in a strategic context.

b. Airborne and air assault forces share many of the same capabilities. They can extend the battlefield, move, and rapidly concentrate combat power quickly like no other available land forces. Airborne and air assault forces also share the same limitations. They are dependent on the availability of airlift assets, fire support, and combat service support resources; they are highly vulnerable to enemy attack by ground and air forces while en route to the LZ and/or DZ; and are equally assailable when operating in open terrain against an armored threat. Environmental conditions and adverse weather can also impact performance. There are four phases of airborne operations: marshalling, air movement, landing, and ground tactical phases. Air assault operations have five phases: staging, loading, air movement, landing, and ground tactical phases.

3. Planning Airborne and Air Assault Operations

a. From the time an operation is announced until it is completed or terminated, echelons of participating components coordinate continuously. The commander, joint task force initiates airborne and/or air assault operations with a planning directive to participating units. The directive is

distributed through normal command channels and pertinent information is issued to subordinate units. After receipt of a directive and preparation of initial estimates and studies, the commanders, staffs, and representatives of supporting forces meet in a joint conference to develop a concept of operations. The concept of operations forms the basis for the preparation of the commander's planning directive and development of OPLANs and operation orders, including a list of forces in support, a schedule of events, and stated conditions under which the operation will begin, be delayed, altered, or terminated.

b. Airborne and air assault commanders begin planning operations with a visualization of the ground tactical plan and work through a reverse-planning sequence. Planning for airborne and air assault operations is as detailed as time permits. For airborne operations, this sequence includes the development of a ground tactical plan, landing plan, air movement plan and marshalling plan. For air assault operations the sequence is the same, but instead of a marshalling plan, loading and staging plans are developed. Direct liaison and coordination between the logistic support agencies of the participating components and other supporting forces occur during the preliminary planning stages. For airborne and air assault operations, intelligence systems assist in accomplishing strategic objectives, including all factors which will impact the arrival of forces into the objective area, establishment of airheads and lodgments, and linkup of forces in preparation for follow-on operations. Also included in the planning process are the following: counterair, information operations, logistics, joint fire support, force protection, special operations, engineer support, public affairs, and military police. When developing the OPLAN, the JFC anticipates that assault forces may face

natural and manmade obstacles that are intended to restrict their movement so that the enemy can mass its forces and repel the assault. Combat engineers facilitate insertion of assault forces and prepare the onward movement to the objective by clearing breaches, roads, and airfields of mines and obstacles.

4. Command and Control

a. The JFC may initiate joint airborne and/or air assault operations in support of strategic and/or operational objectives. The complexity of airborne and air assault operations and their vulnerability require an exceptional degree of unity of effort and operational coherence. The initiating directive is an order to the airborne and/or air assault commander to conduct the operation. It is issued by the JFC delegated overall authority for the operation. JFCs establish command relationships and assign authority to subordinates based on the operational situation, the complexity of the mission, and the degree of control needed to ensure that strategic intent is satisfied.

b. Airspace C2, established boundaries, ability to communicate, and the effective employment of intelligence and EW are key elements in facilitating effective C2 of airborne and air assault operations. The airborne force commander establishes a standard C2 system by defining the functions and responsibilities of key personnel, ensuring that all preliminary operational planning is accomplished, and publishing OPLANs and orders. Air assault operations feature extended distances and speed of execution. To work swiftly under pressure, efforts must be integrated and synchronized. Effective liaison between operational elements of an airborne and/or air assault operation and with higher authorities will facilitate mutual understanding, unity of purpose, and unity of action.

5. Sustainment of Airborne and Air Assault Forces

Minimum CSSEs accompany airborne forces into the airhead or lodgment. They perform most essential services in the marshalling area or they defer them. Combat service support is normally divided into three echelons during deployment: assault, follow-on, and rear echelons. Sustainment of these forces is helped by distribution of supplies, resupply by air including planned resupply, immediate airdrop resupply, and emergency airdrop resupply requests; maintenance during airborne operations; transportation; and health services support. The air assault force is supported by both organic and external elements organized to push supplies, materiel, fuel, and ammunition forward by air. The exact organization and disposition of CSSEs is a function of the air assault force's mission and anticipated follow-on operations.

6. Airborne Combat Operations

a. Airborne forces are committed to combat by parachute assault, airland operations, or by a combination of these two methods. Normally, airborne operations are initiated by parachute assault. Parachute assault permits delivery of combined arms teams into the airhead in less time than airland operations require. Once the assault phase is initiated, it is followed by one or more of the following: a defensive phase; an offensive phase; or an extraction phase.

b. The initial assault stresses the coordinated action of small units to seize initial objectives before the advantage of surprise has worn off. After the initial assault landings accomplish the initial ground missions, commanders must organize the airhead line. Airborne forces defend to protect and retain areas or installations seized

during the assault phase of the operation. Because an airborne assault is most often conducted in the enemy rear, an all-around defense is required. Units can be airlanded on terrain under the control of friendly forces near the line of contact or on secured locations in the enemy's rear; however, it takes time to land a sizable force and a secured LZ is necessary. Even when multiple LZs are employed, it takes longer to mass forces in the airhead during airland operations than during parachute operations. Subsequent operations can include continued defense of the airhead, linkup, passage of lines, relief, withdrawal, or offensive operations, to include exploitation or further airborne and/or air assaults.

7. Air Assault Combat Operations

Whether performed from the sea or from an ISB on land, aviation and combined arms provides the JFC with a remarkably agile fighting force capable of conducting both offensive and defensive operations. The air assault attack (hasty or deliberate) is the basic type of offensive operation conducted by air assault forces. It is the integration of combat, combat support, and CSSEs during the movement into or out of an objective area. Other types of offensive strategies include exploitation, pursuit, secure and defend, reconnaissance in force, and raids. Defense is a coordinated effort by a force to defeat an attacker and prevent the enemy from achieving its objectives. An air assault force screening force provides early warning over an extended frontage. Guard force missions, covering force missions, reinforcement of committed units, linkup operations, river crossing operations, rear operations, limited visibility operations, and ship-to-shore operations must all be considered during air assault operations.

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APPENDIX C

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The development of JP 3-18 is based upon the following primary references.

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APPENDIX D

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

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GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADC	area air defense commander
AAGS	Army air-ground system
AAW	antiair warfare
ABCCC	airborne battlefield command and control center
ACA	airspace control authority
ACO	airspace control order
ADC	air defense commander
ADZ	amphibious defense zone
AF	amphibious force
AO	area of operations
AOA	amphibious objective area
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
ATF	amphibious task force
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CA	civil affairs
CAF	commander, airborne/air assault force
CAP	crisis action planning
CATF	commander, amphibious task force
CI	counterintelligence
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CLF	commander, landing force
CMO	civil-military operations
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
CONUS	continental United States
CSSE	combat service support element
DZ	drop zone
EW	electronic warfare
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FSCM	fire support coordinating measure
HIDACZ	high-density airspace control zone
HIMAD	high to medium altitude air defense
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IO	information operations
ISB	intermediate staging base

J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-6	command, control, communications, and computer systems directorate of a joint staff
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JIPB	joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JISE	joint intelligence support element
JLOTS	joint logistics over-the-shore
JP	joint publication
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
LF	landing force
LOA	lodgment operational area
LOC	line of communications
LZ	landing zone
MACCS	Marine Corps Air Command and Control System
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MCM	mine countermeasure
MEB	Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF	Marine expeditionary force
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain, and weather, troops and support available, time available
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MHE	materials handling equipment
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MPF	maritime pre-positioning force
NCA	National Command Authorities
NSFS	naval surface fire support
NTACS	Navy tactical air control system
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PIR	priority intelligence requirements
PREPO	pre-positioned force, equipment, or supplies
PSYOP	psychological operations
RADC	regional air defense commander
ROE	rules of engagement

SADC	sector air defense commander
SATCOM	satellite communications
SECOMP	secure en route communications package
SLOC	sea line of communications
SO	special operations
SOC	special operations command
SOF	special operations forces
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SPOE	seaport of embarkation
TACC	tactical air control center
TACON	tactical control
TACS	Theater Air Control System
TACSAT	tactical satellite
TAOC	tactical air operations center
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
UHF	ultra high frequency
USAF	United States Air Force
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command
UW	unconventional warfare

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

air control operations. The employment of air forces, supported by ground and naval forces, as appropriate, to achieve military objectives in vital air space areas. Such operations include destruction of enemy air and surface-to-air forces, interdiction of enemy air operations, protection of vital air lines of communication, and the establishment of local military superiority in areas of air operations. (This term and its definition modify the term “aerospace control operations” and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

air assault. The movement of friendly assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support) by rotary-wing aircraft to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

air assault force. A force composed primarily of ground and rotary-wing air units organized, equipped, and trained for air assault operations. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

air assault operation. An operation in which assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support), using the mobility of rotary-wing assets and the total integration of available firepower, maneuver under the control of a ground or air maneuver commander to engage enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

airborne operation. An operation involving the air movement into an objective area of combat forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical, operational, or

strategic mission. The means employed may be any combination of airborne units, air transportable units, and types of transport aircraft, depending on the mission and the overall situation. (JP 1-02)

airhead. 1. A designated area in a hostile or threatened territory which, when seized and held, ensures the continuous air landing of troops and materiel and provides the maneuver space necessary for projected operations. Normally it is the area seized in the assault phase of an airborne operation.
2. A designated location in an area of operations used as a base for supply and evacuation by air. (JP 1-02)

airhead line. A line denoting the limits of the objective area for an airborne assault. The airhead line is bounded by assault objectives that are operationally located to ensure that enemy fires cannot be brought to bear on the main objective and for friendly forces to conduct defensive operations in depth. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

airspace control area. Airspace that is laterally defined by the boundaries of the operational area. The airspace control area may be subdivided into airspace control sectors. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02)

amphibious force. An amphibious task force and a landing force together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. Also called AF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition

and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

amphibious objective area. A geographical area, delineated in the order initiating the amphibious operation, for purposes of command and control, within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

amphibious operation. A military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned mission. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

amphibious task force. A Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations that, together with the landing force and other forces, constitutes the amphibious force. Also called ATF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02)

assault phase. 1. In an amphibious operation, the period of time between the arrival of the major assault forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area and the accomplishment of their mission. 2. In an airborne operation, a phase beginning with delivery by air of the assault echelon of the force into the objective area and extending through attack of assault objectives and consolidation of the initial airhead. (JP 1-02)

beachhead. A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. (JP 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage assessment; (b) munitions effects assessment; and (c) reattack recommendation. The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. The J-3 (operations directorate) is normally the single point of contact for combat assessment at the joint force level, assisted by the joint force J-2 (intelligence directorate). Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

combined arms team. The full integration and application of two or more arms or elements of one Military Service into an operation. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

commander, amphibious task force. Navy officer designated in the order initiating an amphibious operation to command the amphibious task force. Also called CATF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

commander, landing force. The officer designated in the order initiating an amphibious operation to command the landing force. Also called CLF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

connectivity. The ability to exchange information by electronic means. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

coup de main. An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to

achieve success in one swift stroke. (JP 1-02)

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, or enabling system that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. (This term and definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

directive. 1. A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. 2. A plan issued with a view to putting it into effect when so directed, or in the event that a stated contingency arises. 3. Broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct, or procedure. (JP 1-02)

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

fires. The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. (JP 1-02)

fire support. Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operation forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. See also fires. (JP 1-02)

force multiplier. A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian

employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02)

forcible entry. Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

initiating directive. An order to a subordinate commander to conduct military operations as directed. It is issued by the unified commander, subunified commander, Service component commander, or joint force commander delegated overall responsibility for the operation. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (JP 1-02)

intermediate staging base. A temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the host nation. Also called ISB. (JP 1-02)

joint fires. Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. See also fires. (JP 1-02)

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters. See also fire support; joint fires. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. See also joint operation planning. (JP 1-02)

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations area. A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces' mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 1-02)

joint targeting coordination board. A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and preparing and/or refining joint target lists. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB. (JP 1-02)

land control operations. The employment of ground forces, supported by naval and air forces (as appropriate), to achieve military objectives in vital land areas. Such operations include destruction of opposing ground forces, securing key terrain, protection of vital land lines of communications, and establishment of local military superiority in areas of land operations. (JP 1-02)

landing force. A Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations that, together with the amphibious task force and other forces, constitute the amphibious force. Also called LF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

lodgment. A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Marine air-ground task force. The Marine Corps principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, and a combat service support element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not formal commands. The basic structure of the Marine air-ground task force never varies, though the number, size, and type

of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned. Also called MAGTF. (JP 1-02)

Marine expeditionary brigade. A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a brigade service support group. The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), or alone. It varies in size and composition, and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but smaller than a MEF. The MEB is capable of conducting missions across the full range of military operations. Also called MEB. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Marine expeditionary force. The largest Marine air-ground task force and the Marine Corps principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine force service support groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across the range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. Also called MEF. (JP 1-02)

Marine expeditionary unit. A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a

helicopter squadron reinforced, and a task-organized combat service support element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps forward sea-based deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary unit provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of limited combat operations. Also called MEU. (JP 1-02)

marshalling. 1. The process by which units participating in an amphibious or airborne operation group together or assemble when feasible or move to temporary camps in the vicinity of embarkation points, complete preparations for combat, or prepare for loading. 2. The process of assembling, holding, and organizing supplies and/or equipment, especially vehicles of transportation, for onward movement. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational

control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

planning directive. In amphibious operations, the plan issued by the designated commander, following receipt of the order initiating the amphibious operation, to ensure that the planning process and interdependent plans developed by the amphibious force will be coordinated, completed in the time allowed, and important aspects not overlooked. (This term and definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-02.)

seize. To employ combat forces to occupy physically and to control a designated area. (This term and its definition are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

staging area. 1. Amphibious or airborne — A general locality between the mounting area and the objective of an amphibious or airborne expedition, through which the expedition or parts thereof pass after mounting, for refueling, regrouping of ships, and/or exercise, inspection, and redistribution of troops. 2. Other movements — A general locality established for the concentration of troop units and transient personnel between movements over the lines of communications. (JP 1-02)

staging base. 1. An advanced naval base for the anchoring, fueling, and refitting of transports and cargo ships, and for replenishing mobile service squadrons. 2. A landing and takeoff area with minimum servicing, supply, and shelter provided for

the temporary occupancy of military aircraft during the course of movement from one location to another. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supporting arms. Weapons and weapons systems of all types employed to support forces by indirect or direct fire. (JP 1-02)

supporting forces. Forces stationed in, or to be deployed to, an area of operations to provide support for the execution of an operation order. Combatant command (command authority) of supporting forces is not passed to the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

supporting plan. An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan. (JP 1-02)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operational plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in

operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

terminal guidance. 1. The guidance applied to a guided missile between midcourse guidance and arrival in the vicinity of the target. 2. Electronic, mechanical, visual, or other assistance given an aircraft pilot to facilitate arrival at, operation within or over, landing upon, or departure from an air landing or airdrop facility. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data.


The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including: a. In-place units;

b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JP 1-02)

vertical envelopment. A tactical maneuver in which troops, either air-dropped or air-landed, attack the rear and flanks of a force, in effect cutting off or encircling the force. (JP 1-02)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-18** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

